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BOOK REVIEWS
OF CRIMINAL INSANITY.
By Herbert Fingarette.
Berkeley: University of California Press. 1972. Pp. viii,
271. $3.25.

THE MEANING

I.
UNRESOLVED

INTRODUCTION:

VAGUENESS

IN THE LAW OF INSANITY

Although insanity is pleaded quite infrequently as a defense,
for well over a century it has resulted in more disagreement and
more literature than any other defense in the criminal law. This
literature has concerned itself, especially in recent years, not only
with how the insanity defense ought to be formulated, but also
with its very justification. The seemingly disproportionate interest in this defense reflects the fact that it is deeply caught up in a
growing ideological controversy concerning the fundamental direction our criminal law ought to take. For example, some see the
demise of the insanity defense as a first step in the shifting away
from a "punishment" system with its traditional moorings in condemnation for moral fault towards a totally forward-looking system
of "treatment" for the criminally deviant.
While the insanity issue has generated much heated debate,
there has been surprisingly little clarification of the underlying issues. The literature on this topic, largely polemical and inconclusive, suffers most from the tendency of the critics to offer answers
to difficult moral and political questions without adequate conceptual understanding of the meaning of the questions posed and the
principles upon which their answers are based. For example, the
influential Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in its attempt
to justify the insanity defense merely asserted the following:
We make one fundamental assumption which we should
hardly have thought it necessary to state explicitly. . . . It
has for centuries been recognized that, if a person was, at the
time of his unlawful act, mentally so disordered that it would
be unreasonable to impute guilt to him, he ought not to be
held liable to conviction and punishment under the criminal
law.'
But 'the Commission nowhere attempts to tell us what sort of
"mental disorder" warrants the protection of the insanity defense.
1
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Certainly there are those who commit crimes in the grip of passion
and motives which are considered by many to be signs of underlying "mental disorder" whom the Commission would have no
desire to exculpate, and there are other "mentally disordered" individuals who would be exculpated but would not be considered
fit subjects for an insanity plea-e.g., victims of involuntary intoxication. Nor does the Commission attempt to tell us why it would
be "unreasonable" to impute guilt -and to punish individuals who
suffer from the sort of "mental disorders" they have in mind.
The Royal Commission's failure to contend with fundamental
concepts is a reflection of the existing law of criminal insanity.
Although all existing insanity defenses attempt to limit the scope
of the defense by requiring that a defendant suffer from a mental
disease, the very notion of "mental disease" (illness) has no clear
agreed-upon medical meaning; indeed, the wide discrepancies in
its current psychiatric and psychological usages have rendered this
notion virtually meaningless. There are those who prefer not to
use the concept at all, while others use it so broadly that it becomes a synonym for "abnormal behavior," including within its
scope the socially deviant and maladjusted as well as those who
suffer from severe brain damage. Unfortunately, the various insanity defenses do not help in clarifying the class of people to
whom they are meant to apply. Basically, these defenses are
either variants of the M'Naghten Rule which require "knowledge
of the nature of one's act and that it is wrong," or "capacity to
control" tests which require -the power to do otherwise, or combinations of both.
The American Law Institute (A.L.I.) takes the combination
approach in its Model Penal Code, providing in its insanity rule
that:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to
2
the requirements of law.
Although this rule is perhaps the best presently in use, its terms are
couched in unresolved vagueness. The key term "substantial,"
for example, was left totally undefined, as was the word "appreciate" which is used instead of the more traditional "know" so that
the mere detached ability to realize that one's act is criminally prohibited is not sufficient to preclude the defense. By opting for
the term "'appreciate," the A.L.I. was merely following the various
"broader" interpretations of the M'Naghten Rule which speak of
"knowledge" as involving some "insight" into the nature and implications of the act and/or some degree of attendant "emotional
2
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appreciation." Yet if knowledge that one's act is wrong must involve some emotional response such as anticipatory anxiety, guilt,
shame, remorse, or inner moral conflict, the A.L.I. did not consider the apparent fact that there are many types of criminal offenders whom it did not intend to excuse on grounds of insanitye.g., a political criminal, other cultural deviants, and the psychopath-who can commit their acts with as much "lack of affect"
as the schizophrenic whom it did want to so excuse. The meaning
and role of the notion of "appreciation" is simply left without any
clarification. The meaning of "capacity to conform" is left equally
unclear. In the Comment to its insanity rule, for example, the
A.L.I. claims that a distinction can be made between "indisposition" and "incapacity" to conform to the law,8 but nowhere specifies how this distinction can and should be made.
Underlying the A.L.I.'s failure to resolve these problems is
its inadequate analysis of the function of the insanity defense in
the criminal law, which we are told is to distinguish ordinary criminals for whom "a punitive-correctional disposition is appropriate"
from those "nondeterrable" offenders for whom "a medical-custodial disposition is the only kind that the law should allow." 4 Yet
this analysis is deficient, for it fails to recognize that ,there are
some individuals, like Gandhi, who provide paradigmatic examples of nondeterrability, whom neither the general public nor the
A.L.I. would want to classify as insane. If it is the A.L.I.'s desire
to exculpate only those nondeterrables who have a "mental disease," this is another matter-but this is a distinction that cannot
be found in the Comment to its insanity rule. Indeed, if this
distinction had been clearly seen, it would have been incumbent
upon the A.L.I. to attempt to explain why only those who are nondeterrable as a result of "mental disease" require a "medical-custodial" disposition and are to be excused. This, of course, would
have involved coming to terms with the fundamental question of
what "mental disease" should be taken to mean and why only
those who are nondeterrable as a result of it should be excused
on grounds of insanity. Yet the concept of "mental disease" is
left totally undefined by the A.L.I.8
3 MODEL PENAL CODE
4 Id., Comment 1.

§ 4.01, Comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).

5 The A.L.I. was, however, quite aware of the elasticity of the concept of
"mental disease" and was in particular concerned with the tendency of some to
take criminality in itself as symptomatic of mental disease. It attempted to exclude this possibility through a proviso added to its rule that "the terms 'mental
disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct." Id. at § 4.01(2). It is, however, unclear
whether this clause excludes any category of mental abnormality. Even for those
psychiatrists and psychologists who tend to classify all criminals as suffering from
some "mental abnormality," the abnormality so diagnosed will almost certainly be
seen as having at least some non-criminal manifestations.
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FINGARETTE'S ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF INSANITY

With this dismal state of conceptual uncertainty as the backdrop, Herbert Fingarette presents a new analysis of the concept

of insanity in The Meaning of Criminal Insanity.6 Professor of

Philosophy at the University of California at Santa Barbara, Fingarette comes to his task with impressive credentials, equipped not
only with the tools of philosophical analysis, but also with knowledge of psychiatry and criminal law. Unlike so much of the litera-

ture on the insanity defense, Fingarette does not merely criticize
existing formulations of the test of criminal insanity and then offer

a new formulation which merely shifts basic unanalyzed terms into
a new concatenation. Instead, Fingarette attempts the essential
philosophical task of going beyond the mere wording of the defense into its underlying meaning. His book is divided into two
parts of roughly equal length. Part I, "At the Intersection of Psychiatry and Law," consists of discussions of the concept of mental

disease, of the intimate connection between moral and psychiatric
judgments, and of the philosophical "red herrings" in law and psychiatry of "determinism vs. free-will" and "inaccessibility of
mind." This section is generally quite reasonable, if not especially
original. The more interesting and original section is Part II,
"The Legal Concept of Insanity," where Fingarette provides his
own conceptual analysis of the notion of criminal insanity. This
In the Comment referred to in the Proposed Official Draft of its insanity
rule, the A.L.I. tells us that this proviso was included specifically to exclude the
so-called "psychopathic personality" from the category of mental disease. Id. at
Comment 6 (Tent, Draft No. 4, 1955). Although for some "psychopathy" is a
mere "wastebasket category" for habitual criminals, diagnostic procedure is not
this crude for those who have attempted to define the concept of "psychopathy"
and to understand and treat it. For example, if one reads Cleckley's The Mask of
Sanity and studies the case histories he supplies, it is quite clear that a behavioral
syndrome is being presented which goes far beyond repeated criminal behavior.
Though the psychopath's repeated criminal behavior is normally what brings him
to a psychiatrist's attention, a psychiatrist, like Cleckley, in diagnosing his condition, will take into account his motives in committing crimes (e.g., his acts lack
judgment and appear to be inconsistent with professed aims and values), the
nature of his crimes, his reactions to them (e.g., he seems totally devoid of remorse) and his whole life history, including behavior in other contexts (e.g.,
unreliability, unresponsiveness to interpersonal relations and failure to follow a

life plan).

H.

CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY

(4th ed. 1964).

If we are to accept a basically "Clecklian" definition of the psychopath, the
A.L.I. not only fails to exclude him through its proviso from the definition of the
criminally insane, it even fails to justify its desire to exclude him. Surely, if its
interest is only in "nondeterrability," he should be so excused, for unamenability
to punishment is one of the identifying characteristics of the psychopath. (It has
been said that the psychopath is bored and as such will seek to "cut up" more
than the ordinary person in order to relieve the tedium of an unrewarding existence, without caring-or being "capable" of caring-about the nonimmediate consequences of his actions.) If the A.L.I. believed that the apparent "nondeterrability" of the psychopath is different from that of the "truly insane," it should explain that difference; yet no hint of such an explanation is ever given.
6
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section begins with an attack upon the tendency to assimilate a
defense of insanity into traditional defenses of involuntariness or
ignorance and a criticism of traditional formulations of the insanity
test. It then proceeds to a development of Fingarette's analysis
of -the meaning of insanity and its application to particular cases.
Though recognizing the various ideological issues and questions
of public policy that converge on 'the insanity issue (e.g., the very
rationale of criminal punishment, and the justification, purposes,
and limits to be placed on the involuntary confinement of -those
who are seen as dangerous, yet inappropriate objects for criminal
punishment), The Meaning of Criminal Insanity does not pursue
these issues at great length.
With the perspective of the analytic philosopher that he is,
Fingarette sees conceptual analysis as the first required task, without which all else suffers. It is the inadequacies of Fingarette's
own analysis of the notion of criminal insanity that will provide
the basic subject matter for this review. Essentially, I shall argue
that his analysis is no more capable of providing a rationale for
the cases of insanity that he considers paradigmatic than the traditional insanity rules 'he dismisses. I will preface my discussion
with a critique of Fingarette's treatment of the traditional insanity
rules and end it by arguing that his failure to grapple with underlying ideological issues results in a failure to provide a rationale
for the place of an insanity defense within a theory of the nature
and justification of criminal punishment. Fingarette's failure to
grapple with the very conceptual coherence and justification of the
insanity defense is a major inadequacy of his book. Fingarette
to the contrary, ideological and conceptual issues are not easily
separated.
A.

"Knowledge" and "Capacity to Control" v. "Capacity for
Rationality"

Fingarette is sharp in his criticism of the existing state of the
criminal law of insanity which he finds conceptually unclear and
confusing. Although certainly justified in this, he is mistaken in
his apparent belief 'that the traditional "knowledge" and "capacity
to control" tests have clear literal meanings which the law chooses
to avoid in favor of undefined and unusual meanings artificially
twisted to fit paradigmatic cases of insanity.
Considering "knowledge" tests, Fingarette discusses the case
of the melancholic (and "psychotic") mother who as a result of
severe depression kills her newly-born and healthy child to save
it from the sorrows of a cruel and bleak world. One may claim
that such a woman justifiably can be said not to have "really
known" (or "appreciated") that her 'act was wrong. Although
Fingarette shares the belief that such a person ought to be excused
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on the ground of insanity, he will have nothing to do with the attempt to "broaden" the phrases of the traditional insanity rules
to fit such a case, claiming: "This felt need to deepen or amplify
the meaning of the phrases derives from the feeling that these
and an awareness that in their plain sense
phrases must be saved
'7
they do not apply.
This is not a fair appraisal of the situation. Granted that the
phrases have no clear meaning, the criminal law's tenacity in using
them can simply be attributed to the fact that nothing more definite has been offered which would not lead to patent injustice in
particular cases. In addition, the belief that there is a "deeper"
concept of "knowledge of right and wrong" is not a creation of
a confused criminal law, but reflects a distinction, vague and unrefined though it may be, which can be found embedded in ordinary
language as well as the more technical vocabulary of modem psychoanalysis. It would appear to me that there is no "plain sense"
to the question of whether the melancholic mother "knew that her
act was wrong." One may with all justification answer: "In a
sense yes and in a sense no. Certainly, she did in the sense that
she knew that her act would be considered morally wrong and
would merit criminal punishment, and for all we know, she herself
might have believed her act to be wrong; but in another sense,
she did not. Her depressed mood made her 'see' the world in a
totally different way than the rest of us, and that fundamentally
affected her 'knowledge' of what she was doing." If "knowledge
of right and wrong" has a literal meaning, as Fingarette seems to
think, what is it? Certainly it cannot be the mere ability to utter
(or think) the particular words "this act is wrong," for this can
be achieved by a parrot 'as well. One must "know what one
means"; however, as contemporary analytic philosophers have
amply demonstrated, the notion of "what one means" itself has
no simple meaning. 8 Consider, for example, a "psychotic" who
commits a murder and admits to the authorities that he did wrong.
It turns out, however, that his reason for thinking this has absolutely nothing to do with the community's reason for considering
it so. Let us assume that he believes that it is morally wrong to
kill on Mondays, but all right the rest of the week. Is it such
a departure from "ordinary usage" to say that this man simply did
not know what he was doing? I think not.
Fingarette is equally critical of the various "capacity to control" tests, also apparently believing them to have a literal meaning
which the law chooses to ignore. For example, he plainly says
7 Id. at 141.
8 See L. WIrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1953').

Perhaps,

in certain circumstances, for A to truly understand what B means, A must understand "the form of life" of B.
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of James Hadfield and Daniel M'Naghten, who both committed
crimes under the force of delusions, that properly speaking they
would be said to have had the capacity to conform to law.' Why
does Fingarette hold this view? No clear answer emerges in his
analysis.1 ° One must recognize that individuals like Hadfield
and M'Naghten, though acting under delusions, choose their acts
and 'are often capable of carefully planning them and of taking
precautions to avoid detection and capture. They can refrain
from acting if they choose to, and often can be patient in waiting for -the most ideal moment to commit their crimes.
Although he does not think that such individuals should be
said to lack the capacity to conform to law, Fingarette does not
attempt to provide a coherent analysis of the concept which justifies the position he takes. As 'a philosopher, he must, however,
be aware of -the vast number of philosophical analyses of .the
troublesome concept of "capacity to control" or as some prefer,
"capacity (power) to do otherwise." At times, Fingarette seems
to accept one of the more philosophically naive analyses which
claim that an individual "could have done otherwise" means that
"if he had tried (or 'chosen' or 'decided') to do otherwise, he
would have succeeded." If this analysis is accepted, then such
individuals as Hadfield and M'Nagthen must be said to have been
capable of refraining from their illegal acts. But this analysis
should not be accepted, for one may be capable of refraining from
one's aot if one 'tries, but not have the power to try. It is for reasons such as this that more sophisticated analyses consider various
factors relevant to one's capacity to control." For example, one's
power to do A in a situation S should be considered 'to vary directly
with one's power to 'think about A in S. A man who has little
ability to think about the alternatives of -action open to him or their
consequences may have very little "power to do otherwise"; yet
such a man does not yield to psychological and physical forces that
are overpowering, nor does he "'try" to overcome them and fail.
Similarly, a person's power to do otherwise may be severely limited by his ethical convictions or lack of them. When factors such
as these are considered relevant, it is no longer clear that Hadfield
and M'Naghten should be said to have had the capacity 'to refrain
from their criminal acts.
The question: "When does an individual have the power to
9 FINGAREirE, supra note 6, at 139.

10 Obviously, if we are to claim that such individuals as Hadfield and
M'Naghten lack the capacity to control (or as philosophers often put it, the capacity to do otherwise), their incapacity is not the radical sort that negates volition and consequently precludes the existence of an actus reus. In such a case

(e.g., an act resulting from an epileptic seizure), the act is not one that is chosen.
11
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do otherwise?" Fingarette fails to recognize, presupposes a moral
perspective concerning the conditions that are required for the
"proper" imputation of moral responsibility. 2 Yet, when this notion is used in ordinary language and in the various "capacity to
control" tests in the criminal law, a consistent set of moral presuppositions is never made explicit; consequently, the concept suffers
from multi-dimensional vagueness, for a person may be said to
have much power to do otherwise from one perspective, but very
little from another. For example, a person may have great power
to do something if he tries, but little power to attend to considerations which would lead him to realize why he ought to try. Indeed, as my major argument will attempt to establish, it is precisely the same multi-dimensional vagueness and ultimate lack of
definition that inheres in the notion of "capacity to do otherwise"
that will be found in Fingarette's notion of "capacity for rationality." Both notions equally cry out for elucidation, and analysis of
either would bring out very much the same problems.
Though Fingarette often does write as if the traditional insanity tests have a literal and mistaken meaning, at other times he
contends instead -that these tests are misleading and confusing and
that he can supply in their stead a more enlightening and clearer
substitute so that "the jury member would feel much more readily
justified in officially ascribing insanity in cases where its presence
is intuitively evident."' 3 It will be my contention, however, that
this is not achieved. Though the old notions of "knowledge" and
''capacity to conform" do not guide our intuitions as much as they
act as rationalizations for them, the same will be seen to be true
of Fingarette's notion of "capacity for rationality." Indeed, it matters very little which of these notions we choose to use; what does
matter is that one elucidate whichever notion one chooses.
Prior to presenting his analysis of criminal insanity, Fingarette writes:
No doubt when we speak of mental disease in the context of criminal law we do have in the back of our minds some
12 For example, those who claim that "X was powerless to refrain from
A in S" should be analyzed as "X would have refrained from A in S if he had
tried (or chosen, or decided) to" are tacitly taking the moral position that the
causal factors upon which one's capacity to try (choose, decide) depends are to
be completely disregarded in the imputation of responsibility. Yet others claim
that these factors ought to be considered morally relevant and consequently
ought to be incorporated into the notion of "power to do otherwise."
13

FINGARETrE,

supra note 6, at 212. After presenting his analysis of in-

sanity, Fingarette tells us at the end of his book that he would be willing to accept
any of the traditional insanity rules which he now argues are capable of being
interpreted on the basis of his analysis. If the old rules are to be used, he claims,
the trial judge should so interpret them for the jury. Given this position, Fingarette is much too sharp in his original criticism of the existing insanity rules. He
should have suggested that they are misleading without proper interpretation
rather than simply mistaken.
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unique condition or set of conditions that we intuitively appreciate as insanity and as therefore excluding criminal responsibility. It is because of this notion that we think, intuitively,
,that "of course" an act due to mental disease cannot justify
criminal conviction. But the task we have never yet adequately faced up to is to bring out explicitly and clearly what
it is that we have in the "back of our minds," and to see explicitly rather than intuitively how that condition is related to
responsibility status.
I propose now to examine the various specific criteria
that have been proposed as completions of the formula, "Insanity is mental disease such that. . .

."

I propose to show

that none of them really does bring out what we have "in the
back of our minds," and that they therefore cannot cover the
paradigm cases of insanity-unless we gravely stretch the natural meanings of words or ignore them entirely and tacitly
substitute the trier of fact's common sense. I want ultimately
to show that what is needed is

. .

. a specification of the au-

thentic criterion, centering on the notion of a mental makeup
such that there is incapacity for rational conduct,
that we have
14
in mind when we think of criminal insanity.
I find this an exceedingly puzzling claim. Do "we" indeed have
a concept of "insanity" in the "back of our minds"? Any cursory
review of the several studies of actual jury use of the various insanity tests would indicate that certainly "ithe average man" has
no clear concept at all in mind when he classifies someone as insane. 5 This is true, I would suggest, of all of us, regardless of
our medical, legal, or philosophical sophistication. There are conflicting conceptual strands in our use of the concept of insanity
which pull us in different directions. Fingarette is fundamentally
wrong when he writes, as he often does, as if he is dealing with
a definite concept having a "standard" meaning which can be discovered by the penetrating logical eye of a philosophical analyst
like himself. The difficulty of analyzing the concept of insanity
is more than the typical difficulty of borderline vagueness, as
Fingarette seems to think. A study of how the concept of insanity
is used will not yield a single coherent meaning, but will instead
indicate that we are dealing with a cluster of conflated notions
which require delineation. Furthermore, if guidance is to be provided in the formulation of an insanity rule, the mere description
of the several conceptual strands that comprise "our intuitive understanding" of when a person is criminally nonresponsible due
to insanity will not suffice; this understanding will have to be
guided by some coherent reconstruction of the concept of insanity.
14

FINGARETIE,

supra note 6, at 127-28.

15 See, e.g., R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967);

Arens, Granfield & Susman, furors, Jury Charges, and Insanity, 14
U. L. REv. 1-29 (1965).
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What then does Fingarette take the "authentic meaning of
our intuitive concept of criminal insanity" to be? He writes:
[T]he concept which has underlain the intuitively understood
phrase "criminal insanity" can be explicated as follows: It
is the concept of a mental makeup at the time of the offending act such that the individual substantially lacked capacity
to act rationally with respect to the criminality of the act. 16
Elaborating upon his definition, 'Fingarette notes:
[RIational conduct is a notion that alludes to far more than
the purely intellectual or cognitive powers. Acts may be irrational by virtue of excess or defect of emotion, or by virtue
of bizarreness of mood, or
from defect of will, as well as by
virtue of intellectual flaw. 17
Thus, he states:
In general to say that a person has lost his reason is to
say ,that there is something "mad" about the way he conducts
himself. It may be that the madness . . . is distinguished
mainly by an irrational mood which we see as permeating and
dominating what he does; or it may be madness that has as
its most distinctive characteristic certain delusory beliefs or
hallucinatory perceptions; or it may 'be madness that grows
out of such a "flatness" of emotional response ... or capacity
to sympathize or empathize with others, or such perverse desires and tastes, -that the person8 cannot rationally assess the
significance of what he is doing.'
Fingarette concludes:
When we speak of a person as insane, we mean to say of
one . . . that in some sense it is now his nature . . . to act
irrationally. He lacks capacity for rationality . . . but this
lack of capacity must now be a part of his nature and not
merely the temporary effect of special circumstances [e.g.,
temporary intoxication. 19
A criminally insane person must be not merely incapable of
rational conduct, but incapable of conduct that is rational specifically with respect to the criminality of that conduct. That
is, he must substantially lack capacity to rationally
take into
20
account the criminal implications of his act.
Fingarette's emphasis on "rationality" and his notion of "responding relevantly to the criminality of an action" are stimulating
in their departure from the well-worn 'traditional approach. This
refreshing difference jars us from our complacency with the old,
though far from clear, notions of "capacity to conform" and "capacity to appreciate." It is my position, however, that it does no
more. Fingarette does not adequately delineate his concept; it
is not clear which cases fall within it, and which do not, and why.
16

FINGARErrE,

17

Id. at 23.
Id. at 178.

18

supra note 6, at 10.

19 Id. at 195-96 (emphasis added).
20 Id. at 210-11.
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In this respect, Fingarette's notion of "capacity for rational action"
is no less vague, no less exasperating in its analysis, than ,the notions that he is attempting to replace. There is indeed irony in
Fingarette's plight, for though he rejects such notions as "capacity
to appreciate the criminality of an act" and "capacity for emotional
appreciation" as incapable of coherent elucidation, he claims that
having "appropriate emotional reactions" to a situation is part of
the "rationality" he sees as requisite for criminal liability. I see
no basic difference here. Indeed, in a fundamental sense, it matters not at all whether one speaks as Fingarette does of "defect
of emotion" or "flatness of emotional response," or as the traditional approach does of "lack of emotional appreciation," but it
matters immensely that one elucidate whichever linguistic counters one chooses to use.
B.

Fingarette'sParadigmsof Insanity

The cases Fingarette analyzes as paradigmatic of insanity
provide no coherent principle which can justify his intuitive judgments of who should be considered insane. The notions he uses
are instead merely after the fact rationalizations for these judgments. Furthermore, the notions are elusive and as such can be
used to justify excusing individuals that Fingarette gives no indication ought to be excused on grounds of insanity.
Case 1: The Schizophrenic
In discussing insanity -as it relates to "emotional-moral impairments," Fingarette imagines the following:
In our new hypothetical situation Jones is fully responsive to
the relevance of the physical implications of what he is about
to do. ,But he is incapable of responding to the relevant emotional-moral aspects of the situation and his conduct. Jones
. . . is a schizophrenic psychotic. He seems able to carry on
. . . practically to a fair degree . . . but. . . he is emotionally flat and does not respond to the relevance of human suffering. It's not that he enjoys seeing suffering; he just has
no capacity to react. The suffering of others, in its immediate
emotional-moral relevance, is beyond his ken. It is an observable fact to Jones that Smith will be injured, but it has
no emotional or moral relevance, and he cannot respond to
it as such, so he throws the rock, since Smith suddenly makes
a perfect target. Jones can talk about -these matters . . . and
give correct answers; he can talk correctly about the legal proscriptions and the prospect of punishment; and in fact he does
steal away secretly,
21 after having injured Smith, in order to escape punishment.
It is cases such as this that have been used ,to develop California's
21 Id.

at 188.
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diminished capacity doctrine in the law of homicide.22 But what
is the principle involved here which justifies the exculpation of
the schizophrenic-psychotic Jones? Fingarette tells us that Jones
is "incapable of responding to the relevant emotional-moral aspects of the situation," but he does not elucidate. Does he mean
perhaps that the criminal ought to feel guilty or ashamed about
what he has done, that he feel at least a bit sorry for his victim,
that his heart should beat faster, his adrenalin flow more rapidly?
Characteristically, Fingarette is silent. What, for example, morally differentiates Jones from the hired killer or political assassin
who can also commit crimes with no apparent emotional and moral
response? If, as Fingarette suggests, 23 the latter are "capable"
of expressing "appropriate emotional reactions" in other contexts,
he must counter the fact that schizophrenics are not -at all emotionally dead (indeed their problem, it can be claimed, is that in
a sense they are too emotionally and morally alive); ,they too can
respond emotionally and morally in quite appropriate fashion in
certain situations. Just as a Mafia hired killer can "care about"
the welfare of others and consequently appreciate the moral significance of prohibitory legal rules embodied in law, so can the
schizophrenic. Indeed he is quite different from the classical psychopath who is incapable of caring at all about others.24 Fingarette suggests that, at least from a moral point of view, the schizophrenic cannot properly be held criminally responsible because:
He may be restrained or deterred by threats of sanctions or
by physical control, but this is neither responsiveness to law
nor responsibility under law.
It is mere control by fear...
25
sheer power, to his mind.
But how are we to distinguish the schizophrenic from the countless numbers of "common criminals" who have no respect for the
moral authority of the state and the law it enforces, which to them
is brute force (e.g., consider some of the black radicals of recent
years)? These are the questions that cry out for answers, but
none are provided by Fingarette.
One must always be wary of Fingarette's tendency to camouflage these pressing questions by using the elusive notion of "incapacity"-for nowhere does he distinguish that "genuine incapacity to respond to rudimentary moral issues," that the schizophrenic
has, from that mere "indisposition" to do so that the "common
criminal" may display. I would suggest that no matter how the
distinction is made, you will find yourself either excusing more
22 See, e.g., People v. Wolfe, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr.
271 (1964).
23 FINGARETrE, supra note 6, at 189.
24 See, e.g., H. CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANrm
McCo aD & J. McCoyio, THE PSYCHOPATH (1964).
25 FINGARETTE, supra note 6, at 189.

(4th ed. 1964); W.
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criminals than your intuitions originally lead you to or you will find
yourself questioning your original intuitive judgments. For example, if we say that the "schizophrenic" is incapable of responding in -the sense that he cannot be convinced by rational persuasion
to so respond, we fly in the face of those countless psychiatrists
who attempt precisely this. On the other hand, some members
of subcultures have beliefs and attitudes which -are as difficult to
change as those of the "sickest of psychotics." If this is so, is the
cultural deviant as morally nonresponsible as the schizophrenic?
If so, why should there be a legal difference and can that legal
difference be justified on moral grounds?2"
Case 2: The Paranoid Psychotic
The lack of attention given by Fingarette to the moral difference between "sociological incapacity" and "psychological incapacity" is reflected in another example he gives:
Jones is suffering from the delusion that he is being pursued
and persecuted, and is the object of systematic attempts at
assassination. He sees Smith appear in the bushes. He instantly and violently throws the rock at him.
What is it that leads us to characterize Jones as deluded
rather than. . . malicious? It is that, from prior observation
or knowledge of Jones, we have concluded that his belief is
unaffected by relevant evidence or argument; that is, he responds relevantly to that which is consistent with his deluded
belief, but he does not and cannot genuinely respond to anything pointing to the falsity of that belief. If we believed
Jones genuinely considered and took into account what was
relevant, we would view him as mistaken or stubborn. But
the gross discrepancy between the belief he holds and the relevant facts as we see them, and the fanatic character of his
belief in the face of everything, lead us to conclude -that in
this connection he is incapable of rationality,
not merely a
dedicated or stubborn man who is in error. 27
The undeveloped distinctions utilized here will not do. It simply
is false that the typical psychotic suffering from delusions (paranoid or not) cannot be affected by relevant evidence pointing to
the falsity of his belief. Indeed, the intelligent psychotic will be
ingenious in his ability to incorporate any apparent counterexample into his "deluded" view of things; he will often not avoid
challenges but will eagerly attempt to meet them. 28 Fingarette
26 I think a strong case can be made that, at least in some cases, there is
no moral difference; moreover, whatever legal difference we are to make in these
cases is on purely utilitarian grounds of general deterrence and in no sense reflects
the greater moral blameworthiness of the cultural deviant over the schizophrenic.
In order for the law to maintain its moral effectiveness for the mass of generally
law-abiding citizens, certain "fictions" may be necessary. I will not, however,
pursue the matter here.

27 FINGARETrE, supra note 6, at 190-91.
28

Among the many interesting psychiatric cases Robert Lindner relates is
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is too facile in depicting Jones, the paranoid psychotic, as not
"merely a dedicated or stubborn man who is in error," but one
who is "incapable of rationality" because of "the fanatic character
of his belief in the face of everything." What are we to say of
political ideologues such as Angela Davis who see the world on
the basis of an ideology which to some is pure delusion? Certainly
a conservative like William F. Buckley would use very much the
same description of Ms. Davis that Fingarette uses in characterizing the paranoid psychotic, and Ms. Davis, in turn, would see Mr.
Buckley in very much the same way. It is considerations such as
these that have led many sociologists to agree with La Barre's
claim that "there is no discernable difference in the content of a
culture and of a psychosis."2 9 I do not suggest that the answer
is that simple; I do suggest that the question must be tackled in
order to develop a moral rationale for the insanity defense.
Case 3: The Heroin Addict
Let us consider another of Fingarette's examples.
Jones is a heroin addict, at the moment in the throes of intense withdrawal symptoms and in a state, therefore, of desperate craving for heroin and, hence, of desperate need for
some ready cash. Jones does apprehend the physically, emotionally, morally, and legally relevant aspects of his situation
and of what he is about to do (assault Smith). Although he
sees their relevance and groans inwardly, he finds -that he
cannot respond relevantly to these. He is uncontrollably
animal-like in his assault; considerations of humanity can play
no part in what he does. The physical quest to grab Smith's
money is the sole relevant factor to which his behavior is responsive ...
Given the circumstances as described, Jones must be
judged to be acting irrationally; he has lost control over himself and in this respect has lost his reason. In terms of our
formulation, he is incapable of responding to certain aspects
of his situation and conduct that have essential relevancethe suffering and the moral and legal rights of Smith.3 0
I find this case puzzling. If Jones is in the "throes of intense withdrawal symptoms" and attacks Smith in order to obtain money to
purchase heroin, I do not see why he should be said to be "acting
irrationally." Certainly, Jones' action is understandable on the
the story of Kirk, a quite intelligent scientist who believed that he spent part of
his time in space travel and in other worlds. Kirk's ability to weave a tale in
meticulous detail and to attempt to meet criticism on a scientific plane so fascinated Lindner that he almost came to share Kirk's delusion. R. LINDNER, THE
FtFrY-MINUTE HouR 223 (1955).
29 W. LA BARRE, THE HUMAN ANIMAL 246 (1954).
It is interesting in this
context to consider the treatment currently afforded political dissidents in the
Soviet Union who may be looked upon as "psychotics" and placed in mental hospitals.
30 FINGARETTE, supra note 6, at 189-90.
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basis of the ordinary motive of self-preservation. I do not see at
all how Jones is an example of a man who "has lost control over
himself and in this respect has lost his reason." Normally, we
speak of someone as losing control when under the grips of a temporary emotion, he does something which under calmer reflection,
he would have preferred to have refrained from doing, but Jones,
if he were in a calm frame of mind, might find his act justifiable
(or at least excusable) in the circumstances. Furthermore, if we
accept Fingarette's rationale for excusing Jones 'the heroin addict,
are we to excuse everyone who "loses control" over himself? If
the answer to this is obviously no, we need to draw finer distinctions in this case than Fingarette does.
Case 4: The Melancholic Mother
Another person whom Fingarette believes would qualify as
insane under his proposed standard is .the melancholic mother previously mentioned who after much brooding and anguish kills her
newly-born child (in many cases, though not in Fingarette's ex'ample, she will also attempt suicide). In order to show that it
is not the mother's "lack of knowledge" which leads him and
others to want to excuse her, Fingarette tells us to imagine that
in her own view it is a grave sin to kill a child, and continues:
According to her own conscience, then, she has given in to
the temptation to commit a sin, a wrong. 'Using ...
M'Naghten, we should have to find her sane because under
these circumstances she does know her act to be wrong. But
such a conclusion runs squarely counter to our intuitive judgment. A woman who has such a blatant recent background
of hallucination, delusion, psychotic disorganization, and infanticidal thoughts, who has a family background filled with
overt schizophrenia, who kills her own infant for the reasons
mentioned, and who shows up on current psychiatric tests as
definitely schizophrenic is surely to be held insane and nonresponsible if anyone at all is. The question whether, among
all else, she thought herself to be doing what was morally
right or morally wrong is surely beside the point: she is insane, not responsible for her acts or her moral judgments.
What is relevant is the way in which she comes to form her
views and, more importantly, her conduct, not 'the degree 31
to
which her conclusions on moral issues coincide with ours.
Again, what is the principle involved here? Why is anyone who
shows up on current psychiatric tests as definitely "schizophrenic"3 to be held insane in a situation like this?
Id. at 155-56.
Fingarette is too uncritical in his acceptance of psychiatric diagnostic
categories. In this instance psychiatrists will often disagree on when a diagnosis
of schizophrenia is justified and on what that diagnosis means. For a very sharp
criticism of psychiatric diagnostic ability, see Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 650 (1958).
31

32
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Though Fingarette does not make the connection to this case
himself, he makes an insightful point in his critical discussion of
the existing "irresistible impulse" or "capacity to conform" standards of insanity.33 Consider the following passage:
[W]hen, at some moment . . . the person indulges a particular mood even though it is inconsistent with the main pattern
of all he formerly did, thought, or valued, the idiom of being
"dominated" or even "overwhelmed" by the mood may be
apt. The idiom tacitly acknowledges that this is his mood,
that it is he who initiates the mood-related conduct and not
someone else; but the imagery of the divided person helps to
emphasize that one would be in error to assess and judge -the
man as4 a whole by reference to his comportment of the moment.
I think Fingarette is here reaching an important point which is
at the heart of the lay tendency to see mental illness as something
that "possesses" or "victimizes" a person-a psychic cancer that
interferes with a person's normal behavior and consequently affects his very self-identity. 5 Yet when Fingarette presents his
analysis of insanity as "lack of capacity for rational action," he does
not refer back to this conception of "possession" or lack of selfidentity. When he refers to the melancholic mother at this point
in his exposition, it is merely to claim that she is insane because
"[h]er mood and attitude were irrational. Her act was irrational."3 6
Her mood was "not rationally related to her life circumstances. 3 7
In the context of Fingarette's remarks, it seems quite clear that it
is the "unusual" nature of the woman's attitude that makes her act
"irrational" and not the presence of internal conflict and the lack
See FNGARETrE, supra note 6, at 158-72.
Id. at 165-66.
35 The concept of "possession" or "lack of self-identity" may be very apt in
describing certain types of mental illness, but in others it is quite misleading.
The problem here is that many categories of behavioral disorder are used in such
a way that the "disorder" is by definition a complex behavioral syndrome which
constitutes, or at least heavily contributes to the very personality makeup of a person; to say that such a person suffers from a mental disorder is to say that he
suffers from his very own personality and that is quite different from being involuntarily afflicted with some physical disease such as cancer. If we accept such
a model of some mental illnesses, when a person is "cured," he has not simply
been freed of some malicious psychic cancer which had previously interfered with
his "normal" functioning; on the contrary, he can, in a much more appropriate
sense, be said to have been "reborn." Similarly, the assimilation of mental illness
to lack of self-identity, though often quite appropriate for individuals who "lose
their mind," is totally inappropriate for individuals whose mental illness progressively develops and is very much an integral part of the very development of their
personality. In such cases, the notion of mental disorder can only be understood
in terms of deviation from norms of "proper" or of "normal" mental or behavioral
functioning. As such, this notion is conceptually tied to moral and social norms
of how people ought to think, feel, and behave. It is precisely for this reason
that psychiatric judgments as to who "really" has a mental disorder often reflect
different moral preferences.
33

34

86 FINoARETrE, supra note 6, at 176.
87 Id. at 224.
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of identification or coherence of that attitude with her "normal"
personality. I wish Fingarette had pursued this model of victimization or lack of self-identity more fully and applied it to the melancholic mother, for it is certainly worthy of pursuit and application
to that case.
At least one source of our natural sympathy for the melancholic mother's plight stems from precisely this model of possession and lack of self-identity. Having ourselves suffered from
bouts with depression, when we were "not really ourselves," we can
easily empathize with her, imagining ourselves "possessed" by a
severe depression (severer than any we have previously known)
and acting as she did. Perhaps it is primarily the belief that
the melancholic mother "wasn't herself" at the time of her
-act that makes her punishment appear inappropriate to so many
of us (the crime should not be attributed to her, but to the "psychosis" from which she suffered), and it is for this same reason
that we choose to look upon her as "victimized" by an alien condition of 'a pathological nature, requiring the services not of a
warden, but of a physician-someone who can get her to "snap
out" of her abnormal state and to return to her normal one.
Yet the matter cannot end here, for we can easily imagine
other cases of strong internal conflict, of a desire lacking coherence with a person's normal personality, which does not normally
lead us to want to excuse. Imagine, for example, a mild mannered bank clerk, a pillar of respectability, until, one day he finds
himself with an obsessive desire to embezzle. He fights this desire, recognizing its immorality and rejecting it as alien; yet he
feels "possessed" by it and, becoming more and more possessed,
he finally embezzles. Now perhaps we ought to feel the same
towards him as we do towards the melancholic mother, but most
of us simply do not. We can accept the description of his situation
and dismiss its moral relevance. "He should have controlled himself" many of us will say. "There is, after all, no evidence that
he did not have the capacity to do so and that is -themorally relevant factor; it is morally irrelevant that he did not consider his desire to embezzle as part of his 'true' or 'normal' self. After all,
we all, at one time or another, find within ourselves desires which
seem 'alien' to our nature, which seem as if they were imposed
upon us from without. Yet as long as we have some degree of
control over them, we are responsible for them." Yet we will not
often bring this same line of reasoning into play when we turn
our attention to the plight of the melancholic mother who seems
to arouse our natural sympathies much more than the embezzler.
Why is this so? Certainly the difference cannot be in the relative
strengths of their desires, for we have no way to compare them.
It would appear that the difference lies in the ordinary "self-
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interest" of the embezzler's monetary motive as compared to the
"unselfish" nature of the mother's motive to save her child from

a bleak world. Since the embezzler's motive is one which we all
find within ourselves at one time or another (i.e., we want things
that do not belong to us) and have to repress or control, we have

a natural tendency to want to punish the embezzler which we do
not have in the case of the melancholic mother. Since few of us
want to kill our loved ones in order to bestow a supposed benefit
upon them and, believing this to be wrong, successfully control

ourselves, we do not feel cheated; consequently, a prime psychological reason for punishment with its condemnatory force is lack88
ing.
C. Fingarette's Failure to Dissect and Analyze Strands in the
Concept of Insanity

Our discussion of the melancholic mother illustrates the different conceptual strands conflated into an "intuitive" understanding of what constitutes insanity (e.g., the fact that desires or acts

seem to lack coherence with the rest of one's personality or so
overcome one's normal personality that they seem to replace it,

defeating a claim of self-identity; the presence of internal conflict
and indications of personal suffering, the fundamental lack of selfunderstanding and failure to obtain conscious satisfaction from
one's act, and the lack of apparent normal self-interest in the act
or its motive, rendering it "unintelligible" to the average layperson). No one strand can totally capture the elusive concept of in38 According to many psychoanalysts, following Freud, certain unconscious
processes account for the condemnatory and retributive function of punishment.
First, the moral disapproval we feel towards the criminal and the suffering we inflict upon him is a moralistic response (a "discharge of super-ego aggression")
brought about by our own internal conflicts. Since the desires that the criminal
has dared to act upon are present in the ordinary citizen, the criminal is a source
of hidden envy, for he has done what we would have done had our instinctual
desires (id) had its way. But our conscience (super-ego) will have none of this
and consequently we condemn the criminal. As Freud wrote:
The human code of punishment . . .rightly presumes the same forbidden impulses in the criminal and in the members of society who avenge
his offense. Psychoanalysis here confirms what the pious were wont to
say, that we are all miserable sinners.
S. FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO 12 (J. Strachey transl. 1950). Yet moral condemnation of the criminal alone is insufficient; we must prove to ourselves that his
action was really self-defeating, that "crime really does not pay." As John Flugel
puts it:
[t]he criminal by his flouting of law and moral rule constitutes a temptation to the id; it is as though we said to ourselves, "If he does it, why
should not we?" This stirring of criminal impulses within ourselves
calls for an answering effort on the part of the super-ego, which can best
achieve its object by showing that "crime doesn't pay." This in turn can
be done most conveniently and completely by a demonstration on the
person of the criminal. By punishing him we are not only showing him
that he can't "get away with it" but holding him up as a terrifying example to our own tempted and rebellious selves.
J. FLUGEL, MAN, MORALS AND SOCIETY 169 (Penguin ed. 1945).
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sanity. One can only obscure the issue by lumping all these
strands together as Fingarette does and calling them by the single
name of "lack of capacity for rational action."
Certainly the notion of insanity as mere "bizarreness" or "unintelligibility" to the average layperson which Fingarette emphasizes over and over again3 9 is only one of these conceptual strands.
Indeed, this notion is very slippery, for behavior can be seen in
different lights. What may be unintelligible to one layperson
might be quite intelligible to another layperson or to a psychiatrist.
There is, after all, no radical difference in the modes of explanation of human behavior provided by the layperson and the trained
psychiatrist. Psychiatrists, like the ordinary layperson, often can
see the behavior of the same individual differently by emphasizing
different aspects of it and organizing it in different ways. Though
some psychiatrists may see the behavior as irrational, others may
see it as an intelligible and rational attempt to make the best of
an irrational situation.4" And still others will see the behavior as
a partially successful and partially unsuccessful "strategy for living" which differs from ordinary modes of behavior in certain respects and is similar in other respects, but is nevertheless quite
intelligible. If the psychiatrist is forceful in painting his picture
of the defendant's behavior, he may convince a layperson that his
original way of looking at the defendant is not as enlightening in
understanding him as is the "deeper" perception provided by the
psychiatrist; what was originally "bizarre" or "unintelligible" to
that layperson can now become quite intelligible.
Fingarette does not seem to realize that the mere fact that
an act appears "bizarre" or "unintelligible" is rarely considered
in itself sufficient for exculpation. He certainly makes no case
for his apparent position that it should be so considered. Consider, for example, -thefollowing:
Fish, the complacently habitual child killer and child eater,
was found sane under a traditional insanity test, but he was
in fact a very paradigm of insanity. His emotional reactions
and desires were in some respects so distorted that -he had
not the capacity to act rationally insofar as these came into
play. However, his intellectual and perceptual capacities
were not ever substantially impaired, nor was he, apparently,
dominated by depressed or manic moods. When he ate
children or stuck objects into his body, he knew what he was
doing, and he knew-as his actions showed-that what he
was doing was contrary to law and public morality ...
Under M'Naghten . . . or the Model Penal Code formula,
39 Fingarette explicitly states:

[Insanity is not a technical notion but is at bottom a layman's term
referring to grave personal defect in the capacity to act in ways that are

at least minimally intelligible or meaningful to the ordinary man.
FINGARETTE, supra note 6, at 227 n.l1.
40 See, e.g., R. LAING, THE DivIDED SELF (1960).
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Fish was sane. He knew what he was doing, had the capacity to conform to law, but of his own volition did what he
knew was contrary to law. . . . Yet we do not strain language at all, indeed it is exactly apt, to say that his conduct
was grossly irrational. And it is this notion that is the ground
41
for our intuitive but very clear perception that he is insane.

Fingarette, however, merely states and does not argue for his belief that Fish was clearly insane nor does he mention that those
who tried Fish may not have shared the "intuitive but very clear
perception that he [was] insane," for they did, after all, condemn
42
him.
To begin with, we are not presented in this example with
much insight into Fish's mental state at the time of his ghastly acts.
Fingarette tells us that he was not "dominated by depressed or
manic moods." Was he, however, ashamed or guilty for what he
did? Did he feel himself "victimized" by strange and alien desires
that went contrary to his moral code and his conception of himself as a human being and did he try to fight against them, or
did he simply accept himself for what he was, taking his enjoyment
as he found it? Was he totally oblivious of the suffering he caused
others, or was he perhaps aware of it, but too selfish to care?
These are the questions which might weigh on the mind of a juror
in judging Fish's responsibility, but we are given no information
as to -their possible answers. 43 Fingarette instead centers his at6, at 177 (author's footnote omitted).
42 Fredric Wertham, a psychiatrist who testified on behalf of Fish's alleged
insanity, relates this case in his book. F. WERTHAM, THE SHOW OF VIOLENCE
41 FINGARETTE, supra note

(1949). Wertham claims that one of the jurors commented after the trial that
many of them felt that Fish was insane, but should be electrocuted anyway and
consequently convicted him. During the trial, Wertham and two other psychiatrists supported Fish's contention that he was insane, while four others testified
for the state that he was sane. Considering these differences in judgment, one
wonders how Fingarette can speak as he does of "our intuitive . . . perception that
he is insane."
It is interesting to speculate on the underlying motives of those whose "intuitions" would lead them to declare Fish sane and condemn him. Considering
the highly immoral and repulsive nature of Fish's actions and the fact that little
helpless children were involved, for whom most people feel special tenderness and
regard, it may be especially difficult to make a distinction between the moral evil
of the act and that of the actor. In our bitterness and revulsion towards Fish's
acts which run counter to deep moral sensibilities, we may fear that to excuse
Fish would be to show toleration for his acts as well. Or perhaps, the desire to
reject Fish's actions so overshadows questions as to his moral blameworthiness,
that one expresses total rejection of these actions through the moral condemnation
of their perpetrator. Since Fish was neither "a drooling, helpless idiot" nor a person who gave the indication of having suffered from and fought against "alien"
desires and then repented after acting upon them, there would be no natural sympathy for such a person and consequently no desire to find a rationale to excuse
him.
43 Though Fingarette does not pose these questions nor indeed delve into
Fish's personality at all, Wertham does throw some light on Fish's personality.
He writes:
There was no known perversion that he did not practice. .

.

.

When

Fish was five years old he had a woman teacher who used to spank the
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tention only on the obviously "bizarre" nature of Fish's desires."
His claim that Fish's "emotional reactions and desires were in
some respects so distorted that he had not the capacity to act rationally insofar as these came into play," is curious. Obviously,
Fish in a sense did act quite rationally "insofar as his desires came
into play," since he killed and ate several children before he was
finally caught. It would appear that Fingarette is simply asserting
that the nature of Fish's unusual desires in itself precludes his rationality. But what precisely is the principle involved here? Are
we to consider as insane all those whose desires are "bizarre"?
What of the common sense rejoinder that it is not so much the
nature of the desire that merits exculpation, as the power to overcome that desire-precisely the direction of traditional "capacity
to control" tests that Fingarette dismisses? Fingarette does not
consider this question.
children frequently on their bare bodies. At that early age he used to
derive sexual pleasure from having this done to him and seeing it done
to others.
Sadomasochism directed against children . . . took the lead in his

sexual regressive development ....
Id. at 72.
When Fish was in his middle fifties a definite psychosis with delusions and hallucinations began to develop insidiously. Always intensely
interested in religion, he began to be engrossed in religious speculations
about purging himself of inequities and sins, atonement by physical suffering and self-torture, human sacrifices ....
He had visions of Christ and His angels .

. .

. He heard them say-

ing words like "stripes," "rewardeth," and "delighteth." And he connected these words with verses from the Bible and elaborated them delusionally with his sadistic wishes ...
• . . He felt that he was ordered by God to castrate little boys.
* . . He had episodes . . . during which he craved or executed his
sadistic and autosadistic activities in a mental state of horror and rapture, or ecstasy and confusion, with or without hallucinations. Frequently he enjoyed these experiences (e.g., sticking needles into himself)
to the point of orgasm.
Questioned about these needles, he gave me five conflicting-but to
his mind apparently not contradictory-explanations. He said that he
did it to relieve the pain from a hernia; that he "got a sexual kick out
of it"; that he did it to punish himself for what he did to others; that
"voices told me to purge myself of sin ..
"
* ' * [I]n talking about the murder of Grace Budd and his previous
sadistic acts, he made no attempt to blame them on his supernatural messages. He said to me, "I am not insane, I am just queer. I don't understand it myself......
He always mixed up his explanations when he
talked about these messages, saying both that he had the desire to do
something and that he was commanded to do something. These discrepancies in explanation never bothered him at all.
Id. at 75-77.
44 Certainly Wertham looks beyond the bizarreness of Fish's act as a basis
for exculpation. From his discussion, it would appear that he was quite content
to rest the case for Fish's insanity on the M'Naghten test. Wertham points to
Fish's psychotic symptoms, in defending his testimony that Fish "does not know
the nature and quality of his acts. He does not know right from wrong." Particularly telling for Wertham was that Fish told him that "What I did must have
been right or an angel would have stopped me, just as the angel stopped Abraham
in the Bible." Id. at 85. Also influencing Wertham's judgment that Fish was insane was the "matter-of-fact way" in which Fish described in minute details the
manner in which he practiced his cannibalism.
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It would appear that the mere statistical unusualness of a desire or a mode of behavior is the criterion involved in determining
its "bizarreness" or "unintelligibility" for Fingarette. But if this
is so, should we classify homosexuals as insane and consequently
free them of moral and legal responsibility for their actions? If
the answer is no, is it simply because there are too many of them
about and consequently their desires and actions are not "unusual"
enough? If so, would the situation be any different if the incidence of homosexuality were statistically much lower? Would we
then classify the homosexual in the same insane category as Fish?
How many homosexuals, one may ask, must there be before they
can be held morally responsible? If Fish is to be declared insane
on the basis of the "bizarre" nature of his desires, must we change
our opinion of him if we find that there are more like him than
we originally thought? Fingarette gives no hint of his answers to
these puzzling questions. Yet this is not a trivial matter, for answers to these questions are necessary if one is to distinguish the
bizarre desires, beliefs, and actions of an individual who is for that
reason considered "sick" from those of a shared way of life, ideology, or religion.
D.

Condition v. CausalAntecedents

Fingarette's analysis is misleading in another respect. Especially in the first part of the book, when he is simply critical of
the existing state of the law as regards criminal insanity and has
not yet presented his own view, Fingarette clearly writes as if the
justification for a classification of insanity will ultimately involve
certain causal antecedents which result in certain sorts of behavior.
The inference is that the same sort of behavior would not be excusable if the cause were different. For example, he writes:
The general lesson . . . is that it is not the person's own moral
view that identifies insanity but something defective about the
way in which he comes to decide to think and act as he does.
The verbal cue or label we use to denote this defect in the
way he comes to act as he does is the phrase "because of
mental disease."
. [Similarly] it is not what a person wills, or intends,
or what he actually does which is of the essence for identifying
insanity. Instead, it is something defective . . . in the way
he comes to these decisions, intentions, and actions. And
whatever is the specific nature of this defective way of forming intention and action, it is closely related to what we mean
when We advert to the . . . phrase, "mental4 5 disease," and say
that the person suffers from mental disease.
In other words, it is not the condition that exculpates, but the cause
45 FINGARETTE,

supra note 6, at 156-57.
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of that condition. Yet when Fingarette finally does present his
view, it is clear that this is not his final position. For example,
he writes:
One could say, idiomatically, that the mother was in the grip
of an irrational mood and that she could not help what she
was doing. One could say of Hadfield that he did not really
understand his act . . . . Then we might elaborate and go
on to say that the mother could not help what she was doing
because she was irrational, and that Hadfield did not really
know what he was doing because he was irrational. However, this "because" must not confuse us. For the loss of reason is not a "cause" of the loss of self-control or the lack of
true understanding. Rather . . . [they] are idiomatic ways
of characterizing the way
in which these individuals mani46
fested their irrationality.
Now when he speaks of lack of rationality, Fingarette is characterizing the act in a particular way and not attempting a causal
explanation of it-i.e., it is the actual behavioral manifestation that
is important and not the causal antecedents of it. This becomes
even clearer when Fingarette, in passing, makes the remark that:
When we make a judgment of defective capacity, we are
characterizing the man's mind . . .by reference ,to the pattern of his observed conduct. . . . These judgments are not
merely discoveries of facts; they 4are
7 in part decisions about
how we choose to view the person.
This remark cries out for clarification, but none is supplied. If,
indeed, our classification of a person as insane is at least in part
a decision "about how we choose to view the person," then is it
not possible for different people to view the same person differently? Is there not a sociological dimension here-i.e., different
cultural beliefs generate different classifications of people? Are
there not, perhaps, as I have suggested previously, many different
factors which motivate us to view a person in a certain light?
I am always uncomfortable when Fingarette says with -a note
of certainty that someone is "plainly insane." 4 When he makes
this statement, he loses sight of his important point that a conceptual choice is being made which is not totally determined by "the
facts of the case"-different decisions being possible "on the same
facts." Certainly reference to certain people as "plainly insane"
is inconsistent with a professed belief that a classification of insanity is not determined by "the facts." The impression developed
in the first part of his book that a description of the causal antecedents of insane behavior would be forthcoming, apparently leads
Id. at 176-77.
Id. at 196.
We should not lose sight of the fact that those who quite clearly have
"lost touch with reality" will be weeded out of the criminal process, either through
46

47
48

civil commitment or by being declared incompetent to stand trial.

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22: 705

Fingarette to believe that the concept of insanity is more definite
than it really is. It leads to the mistaken belief that ultimately
he will provide the reader with the specific defects or sorts of defects which give rise to insane behavior and supply a justification

for granting them exculpatory status.
I.

FINGARETTE'S CONCEPT OF INSANITY:

UNRESOLVED

VAGUENESS AGAIN

After presenting his analysis and supporting examples, Fingarette tells us that a jury should be presented with a concept
which clearly differentiates the insane from the sane. Yet, it is
precisely this clear differentiation that he does not supply. No
clear distinction ever emerges in his analysis between the person
who "lacks the capacity for rationality" and the person who has
that capacity but "chooses not to use it." Nor is any analysis given
of what is involved in "responding to the criminally relevant aspects of one's conduct." Fingarette quite rightfully points out that
not all types of irrationality should count as insanity,4 9 but he never
tells us which kind should. It simply will not do to say -that "to
be able to act rationally with respect to the criminality of one's
conduct. . . . is simply to be able to rationally take into account
the implications of the act relevant to criminality,"5 0 without specifying, as Fingarette does not, what these implications are. Similarly, it will not do to speak glibly as Fingarette does of the distinction between the "stupid, immoral, greedy, ruthless, imprudent,
49 The problem is more complicated than this, for Fingarette believes that
there is another condition built into the notion of insanity. He writes:
[Wihen we say a person is insane, we say more than that he acts irrationally or even that he lacks capacity to act rationally ...
When we speak of a person as insane, we mean to say . . . that
in some sense it is now his nature, his makeup, to act irrationally. He
lacks capacity for rationality, true enough, but this lack of capacity must
now be a part of his nature and not merely the temporary effect of special circumstances.
FINGARETrE, supra note 6, at 195-96 (author's footnote omitted). Fingarette says
this in order to distinguish the insane from individuals such as those under the
influence of alcohol or some other drug and those suffering from "a severe blow
on the head or suffering other severe but temporary trauma." Unfortunately, the
distinction is not so simply made. First, there might be many necessary conditions needed to trigger an insane act, one of which may be a temporary external
stimulus without which the act would not occur (e.g., Robert Lindner describes
a case in The Fifty-Minute Hour in which a girl's ring triggers unconscious associations and results in her brutal murder). R. LINDNER, THE FIFTY-MINUTE HOUR
(1955). In order to take care of cases such as these, one would have to analyze
"cause located in mental makeup" to entail the notion that a precipitating event
would not be sufficient to result in the act in question if imposed upon the "average person." In addition to this problem, Fingarette does not consider the implications of his claim that the "incapacity for rationality" should be part of the
defendant's nature and not an effect of temporary circumstances on a plea of
temporary insanity. If this is not to be ruled conceptually incoherent, some
more detailed analysis is required.
50 FINGARETrE, supra note 6, at 211.
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or impulsive" and those who have "lost their reason"'" (or, one
would suppose, never had it), without presenting the standard or
standards by which this distinction is to be made.
If, for example, as Fingarette claims, individuals like
M'Naghten are "substantially affected in their capacity to act rationally with respect to criminal law," why is this so? M'Naghten
knew that his act was illegal and knew that if he were caught he
would be punished, and though I do not know the details, one can
assume that he acted rationally in his attempt to escape. The current law, to be sure, never gives any clear answer to this question.
According to the A.L.I. rule, for example, it could be said that
as a result of his delusion, M'Naghten lacked "substantial capacity
to appreciate the criminality of his act." Fingarette, on the other
hand, says that he "lacked substantial capacity to act rationally with
respect to the criminal law." Without the needed clarification,
we have achieved nothing. Fingarette tells us:
[T]hose who propose replacing "know" with "appreciate" or
comparable language fail to give any specific and acceptable
meaning to the new terms. . . . [S]uch "improvements"
'52
do not aid us in understanding what we mean by "insanity.
Conduct is insane . . .when it is not shaped in the light of
certain norms. These . . .are norms regarding what emotions, or moods, or attitudes, or desires are in some sense suitable or proper with respect to certain other aspects of one's
situation. Clearly there is much room for variety here ....
But there are limits. These are the limits that
distinguish
53
the irrational and unintelligible from ,the rational.
Yet, we can bring exactly the same criticism to bear upon his analysis and charge that if there are such "limits," Fingarette has nowhere supplied them.
IV.

FINGARETTE'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER UNDERLYING

PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS
A basic inadequacy in Fingarette's book is his failure to
anchor his discussion of criminal insanity within a philosophical
theory of the nature and justification of criminal punishment and
excusing conditions. The inconclusive quality of the literature
concerning the proper formulation of an insanity defense, including Fingarette's contribution, stems from this basic failure. Once
the passionate exhortation is put aside, we find that we are offered
some insanity test, but are not clearly told what precise function
this test performs or ought to perform within the criminal law. Indeed, as in Fingarette's book, the ultimate question of the very
51

Id.

G2

Id. at 152 (author's footnote omitted).

53

Id. at 183.
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conceptual coherence and justification for this defense remains unposed in most of the literature.
A.

Excusing Conditions Within the CriminalLaw

In discussing excusing conditions, Fingarette is concerned
with showing the legal irrelevance of the abstract philosophical
view that free-will is incompatible with determinism (i.e., the view
that every event has a cause). He claims, for example, that from
a legal perspective, the question of whether or not an act was the
result of "duress" has nothing to do with whether or not it was
caused. The legal excuse of duress is accepted because
we recognize human frailty and do not normally expect resistance to imminent mortal threat . . . . Resistance in such
circumstances . . . is heroic . . .
It is because our blame
and praise are attuned to man as we can ordinarily expect
him to be that we do not condemn one who gives in to genuine coercion . . . This is a truth of common sense and
plays its role in common practice; it is neither based on nor
commits one to any particular view, one way or another, conconcerning . . . universal causality . . .5
Leaving aside the dubious philosophical conclusions one can draw
from this, Fingarette calls our attention to the important fact that
the law often operates with so-called "objective" standards of what
the "average person" (assumed to be "reasonable") would feel,
believe, and do in a given defendant's "place." As contemporary
debate over the relative merits of "objective" versus "subjective"
liability amply demonstrates, jurists are exceedingly wary of introducing a general principle into the law which would make it a universal requirement of criminal liability that the accused must have
been able to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law
he is alleged to have violated. 55 Instead the law acts "as if"
id. at 80.
55 See, e.g., the A.L.I.'s discussion of its reasons for rejecting the subjective
approach to duress. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, Comment 6 (Tent. Draft No.
10, 1960), quoted in M. PAULSEN & S. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
541-42 (1969).
The question of "subjective" vs. "objective" liability is one of those ultimate
questions of moral and social policy in which the law uneasily compromises between conflicting principles. Issues in this area are presently enmeshed in controversial legal flux and development. First, notions of subjective liability are filtering into Anglo-American law through the development of various doctrines of
"diminished responsibility," where an individual's "diminished capacity" is used as
a ground for reducing criminal liability. Secondly, the question of whether criminal liability ought to be made contingent upon an individual's actual capacity to
conform ("the capacity principle") is entangled in the United States with constitutional provisions guaranteeing "due process" and prohibiting "cruel and unusual
punishment." The argument has been made that these notions constitutionally require that the capacity principle be considered a basic presupposition for criminal
liability. For example, the Supreme Court's decision that punishment for the
"status" of narcotic addiction is "cruel and unusual punishment" can only be made
coherent conceptually on the basis of an adherence to the capacity principle.
54
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people are capable of self control unless they fall into the established categories of infancy or insanity. Consequently, the underlying principles behind the presently accepted legal excuses of accident, mistake and duress are significantly different from those
behind the excuses of infancy and insanity. For the first class of
excuses the law tacitly assumes a community of "average," "reasonable" citizens, having roughly similar capacities to reason, to
judge consequences and to exercise self-restraint, capacities enabling them to conform their conduct to legal rules. It is for this
reason that these excuses rely heavily upon the notion of "the
reasonable person" and not upon the differing capacities of individuals. In such excuses individuals are simply assumed to have
the capacities attributed to this "reasonable person." If there is
a single principle underlying all these excuses, it is that one cannot
justly punish an individual for doing what "the reasonable person"
would have done.
Yet realizing that some individuals cannot justly be expected
to have the capacities which the law tacitly assumes of the average
citizen, the excuses of infancy and insanity are recognized. Such
excuses attempt to isolate those "nonaverage," "nonreasonable"
individuals whom the general community would consider it patently unjust to punish (or blame) for not abiding by the same
standards of conduct to which the average citizen is held. From
this perspective, the insane are those adults who are perceived by
their community as so dissimilar that it would be wrong to hold
them to moral and legal standards which simply were not designed
with them in mind. Gabriel de Tarde, an Italian legal philosopher
at the turn of the century, recognized this essential point when
he claimed -that "social similitude" as well as personal identity are
constitutive of the notion of individual responsibility. He wrote:
In order for me to judge an individual to be responsible for
a criminal action committed a year, ten years ago, is it enough
for me to believe that he is the identical author of this action?
No, for though ,Imight have brought the same judgment of
identity to bear in the case of a murder committed on a European by a savage of a newly discovered isle, yet I would not
have the same feeling of moral indignation and of virtuous
hatred as a similar act carried out by one European on
another, or by one islander on another, would inspire within
me. Therefore one indispensible condition for :the arousing
of the feeling of moral and penal responsibility is -thatthe perpetrator and the victim of the deed be and should feel themselves to be more or less fellow-countrymen from a social
standpoint, that they should present a sufficient number of
resemblances . ... 56
See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Yet the Supreme Court has not
yet been willing to explicitly accept this principle. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514 (1968).

50 De Tarde, The Theory of Responsibility, in
48 (H. Morris ed. 1961).
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De Tarde draws our attention to the important insight that criminal punishment presupposes the existence of a community of individuals who identify with each other within a background of mutual cooperation and kinship. Within such a community, a violation of certain community interests by members from within is a
moral issue since the offender of these interests, the criminal, is
seen as having a moral obligation to respect these interests. For
this reason, a community's reaction to a criminal carries with it a
judgment of moral censure and is unlike the mere hostility directed
to sources of danger from without; ,the criminal is not merely an
enemy, but a traitor to the community to which he is seen as tied
by the bonds of moral obligation. If we accept this general position, the problem that remains is the systematic analysis of the
types of dissimilarity that as a matter of fact motivate us to consider
individuals "insane" and the factors (if any) that ought to so motivate us. Indeed, the great advantage of Fingarette's fresh approach to the insanity issue lies precisely in its ability to cut away
from the old sterile questions and 'to direct our attention to the
same questions that de Tarde's analysis invites.
B.

The Coherence and Justification of the Insanity Defense:
At the IdeologicalCrossroads

Fingarette's failure to grapple with 'the fundamental question
of the conceptual coherence and justification of the insanity defense is reflected in his much too facile dismissal of the entire
"free-will vs. determinism" issue. Some of those who deny
man's free will do not merely assert that human acts are caused
and ipso facto unfree (the only view that Fingarette discusses),
but are more subtly asserting that a psychological and sociological
understanding of 'the "springs of human behavior" would undermine any morally adequate distinction between the morally blameworthy and the morally nonresponsible; this, in turn, would undermine any coherent defense for the excuse of insanity. A moral
skeptic, looking upon the vast edifice of our criminal law, deeply
embedded with the moral condemnation of the criminal, could argue, with much justification, that the law tends 'to operate with
morally unsupportable standardized conceptions of what the vast
majority of "normal" individuals have the power to do and can
reasonably be expected to do. On the basis of this mistaken paradigm of the normal citizen as a member of a society having a fair
and equal distribution of benefits and burdens, the "normal"
criminal is perceived as a fit object for moral condemnation, even
though there are a few "insane" criminals who are not. This, the
skeptic will claim, is simply not so. An understanding of the
causal determinants of behavior will undermine any distinction of
this sort.
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If the skeptic is right, any attempt to formulate a clear insanity defense will prove futile, for as we attempt to delineate the
various dissimilarities that justify exculpation on the grounds of insanity and as we learn more about the underlying causes of human
behavior, we will find that the vast majority of criminals can be
made to fit into some class of insane dissimilarity. If this is so,
some will say that the only morally justifiable approach would
be the elimination of a punishment system anchored as it is on
the concept of moral fault and condemnation and its replacement
with a totally "forward-looking" system of "treatment" for the socially deviant. Others, accepting as inevitable a community's retributive feelings towards some of its offenders, and recognizing
that a person may be more apt to be deterred if he sees his contemplated offense as "morally wrong" and the community's indignant condemnation of him as "just" and "deserved," may suggest
that we continue with the fiction that the majority of criminals are
blameworthy. The insanity defense, they may claim in turn,
should be maintained as a necessary safety valve for the preservation of this fiction. The issues here cannot be easily resolved.
Yet it is precisely their ultimate resolution which will determine
the fundamental direction of the criminal law in the future.
VICTOR GRASSiAN*
* Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Harbor College, Wilmington, California. Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles, 1970; B.S. in
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Daniel Mandelker. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company.
1973. Pp. xvi, 246.

HOUSING SUBSIDIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND.

I.

COMMON ANGLO-AMERICAN

HOUSING CONCERNS

England and America may be, in a phrase ascribed (perhaps apocryphally) to Winston Churchill, "two great nations separated by a common language," but they are surely united by a
common concern and controversy about the allocation of housing
resources. Indeed, as Daniel Mandelker has observed, "[n]o social problem has proved more intractable to the western democra-

cies than housing."' A recent study of housing in fourteen nations
declared that "no nation in the world is fulfilling a goal of decent
sanitary housing for every family." 2 This includes the United
States and England, for although there have been undeniable improvements in the quantity and nature of housing in these two
countries, the situation is far from acceptable. 3 Former President
Richard Nixon admitted that in the United States "too many lowincome families have been left behind: they still live in substandA more perard, overcrowded and dilapidated housing . . . .
manent testament to the elusiveness of adequate shelter equitably
distributed is found in the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974, wherein Congress appended the following confession
1 Mandelker, Strategies in English Slum Clearance and Housing Policies,
1969 Wis. L. REV. 800.
2 C. ASCHER, THE ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLICLY AIDED HOUSING 9 (1971).
3 See Scott, Inadequate Housing Estimate for the U.S. Doubled, L.A.
Times, Dec. 12, 1973, pt. I, at 1, col. 4, which reported:
[A] two-year study was conducted by Harvard University and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology through their Joint Center for Urban Studies. It found that public and private emphasis on new construction in the 1960's did decrease the proportion of families living in physically substandard housing.
It predicted 23 million new housing units would be built between
1970 and 1980 but said that would not necessarily be enough to help the
households it described as "housing deprived."
The study also disclosed that 13.1 million low and moderate-income American
families are living in households described as physically deteriorated, overcrowded,
or too expensive.
In England, production has not kept pace with need, and the 319,100 new
homes completed in 1972 was the lowest in ten years, except for the following
year when during the first half of 1973 only 148,400 homes were completed. This
was 15,500 less than in the comparable 1972 period. Hillman, Building of Houses
at New Low, The Guardian (London), July 3, 1973, at 1, col. 7.
4 President's Message to Congress, Sept. 19, 1973, reported in 9 Weekly
Compilation of Pres. Doc., No. 38, at 1141-42; 119 CONG. REC. H 8070 (daily
ed. Sept. 19, 1973).
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to its amendment of the "National Housing Goal" contained in the
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968:
The Congress further finds . . . that the deterioration
and abandonment of housing for the Nation's lower income
families has accelerated over the last decade, and that this
acceleration has contributed to neighborhood disintegration
and has partially negated the progress toward achieving the
national housing goal. ....
5
Although general agreement exists in the United States that
thus far "social and economic inequalities" in housing have not
been "arranged so that they are . . . to the greatest benefit of
the least advantaged," 6 there has never been a coordinated attack
on the housing problem which is gnawing at the heart of the country's declining urban centers. 7 In England, successive governments have at least proposed coherent overall housing policies.
However, even though the number of unfit British dwellings has
been reduced and the overall quality of housing has been improved in recent years, some people do not share in this achieve5 Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. VIII, § 801(2), 88 Stat. 721 (1974), amending
42 U.S.C. § 1441a (1970).
6 J.RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 83 (1971), reviewed, Grey, The First
Virtue, 25 STAN. L. REV. 286 (1973). See also Michelman, The Advent of a
Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIr. LI. L. REV.
207 (1970).
The concern for a more equitable distribution of housing resources is more
than philosophical. In the context of a prevailing ideology and tradition of egalitarianism, social cohesion may turn on a reasonably just allocation of wealth, for
as James Madison declared, "the most common and durable source of factions has
been the various and unequal distribution of property." THE FEDERALIST No. 10,
at 131 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
7 [G]overnments at all levels (federal, state and local) almost never
adopt policies that adequately respond to all the relevant factors. Instead, they tend to make partial, selective policy responses focused
mainly upon physical production or construction, rather than social
factors, because the former are both more visible and much easier to
control than the latter ....

Another class of policies that governments

usually avoid are those requiring considerable time between inputs
(which cost money) and outputs (which generate political support); the
timing of recurrent elections gives most political leaders short-run perspectives. These biases make federal policies far less effective in dealing
with the needs of low-income households in areas of concentrated poverty than in dealing with the needs of middle-income and upper-income
households on the urban periphery.
Downs, The Successes and Failures of Federal Housing Policy, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1974, at 124, 142. Cf. Burkhead & Campbell, Public Policy for
Urban America, in ISSUES IN URBAN ECONOMICS 637 (H.S. Perloff & L. Wingo
eds. 1968),

reprinted in THE CITY:

PROBLEMS

IN

URBAN PLANNING 92 (M.

Stewart ed. 1972). The suggestion has been made that coordinated and coherent
policy-making on a national scale is an impossible dream:
In the polemics surrounding American urbanism and metropolitanism
there is a persistent demand for a unified federal urban policy...
Such a condition will never exist. The American decision process
simply does not work that way. Policy changes are incremental, not
sweeping.
Id. at 92.
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ment and their condition may have actually worsened." Despite
improvements, serious and pervasive inequalities' remain to challenge the imagination, will, and power of the British government

at a time when its capacity to effectively rule is being seriously

questioned. 10
Thus, Daniel Mandelker's Housing Subsidies in the United
States and England" is available at a propitious moment. This

comparative study of public housing schemes is an important analysis of the central problems of providing housing for those who
cannot obtain it unaided. The discussion of American public housing delineates many issues that have been raised by national

efforts to provide "decent, safe and sanitary"' 2 low-income hous8 The recently ousted Conservative government in Great Britain confessed
in one of its last White Papers on the housing situation:
For too long, too many people in this country have had to live in
unfit or inadequate homes, despite vigorous policies which have begun
to reduce the legacy of past neglect in the physical condition of our older
housing. In 1967 when the first National House Condition Survey was
made, there were 1.8 million slums in England and Wales; by the end
of this year the figure will be under 1 million ...
This progress, while encouraging, provides no ground for complacency. Much remains to be done. Almost one household in six still
lives in a house that is unfit or lacks at least one of the basic amenities.
These worst physical conditions are increasingly concentrated in our cities and older industrial towns in parts of which there is intolerable overcrowding and multiple occupation. The decline of the private rented
sector is adding to the hardship of many families in stress areas and, at
the same time, reduces the stock of rented homes for workers moving
to take up new jobs in districts where local authority housing may not
be available. In some places conditions are getting worse, not better.
We must not only maintain the drive to improve the physical condition
of our housing. We must do so in ways that will give most help to those
people in greatest need and make the best contribution towards solving
the many social problems inextricably linked with bad housing.
BETTER HoMES-THE NEXT PRIORITIES, CMND No. 5339, at 1 (1973).
9 An additional and shocking indication of the inequality in the allocation
of housing resources was found by a study of homelessness in London which declared that
the numbers of homeless have continued to rise. By the end of 1970
there were some 25% more homeless people in local authority 'temporary accommodation' in London than when the study had been
commissioned as a matter of urgency eighteen months before.
J. GREVE, D. PAGE & S. GREVE, HOMELESSNESS IN LONDON xix (1971).
10 It is easier to understate than to exaggerate the seriousness of the
position which [Britain] is now in. Britain faces the most precarious
crisis in its peacetime history with the most precarious Government it
has had for nearly a century. .

.

. It is not.

. .

a Government in which

the country has any great confidence, and it may not even be
a Government, in its initial stages, which has any great confidence in
itself.
The Old Firm, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 1974, at 13. October 1974 elections
called by the Labour party gave it a majority in the House of Commons-by two
seats and less than 40 percent of the total popular vote. But as a Los Angeles
Times editorial put it, "the grave questions remain." L.A. Times, Oct. 14, 1974,
pt. II, at 6, col. 1.
11 D. MANDELKER, HoUsING SUBSIDIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND
(1973) [hereinafter cited as MANDELKER].
12 The phrase is from the policy declaration that precedes the new sub-
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ing on a mass basis. Although the British effort dwarfs the American, 3 the comparison of the two systems does reveal the strengths
and weaknesses of each.
As Mandelker indicates, American public housing subsidies
have been "deep" but limited to very few units in the market. 14
The subsidies have a major impact on the housing costs of those
who receive them, but. with such a relatively limited supply of
available units, eligible households are forced to scramble for a
limited number of vacancies. In the meantime, housing often deteriorates so much that even the desperate will not live in it, and
those "in charge" sometimes resort even to demolition of the units
because rehabilitation is too expensive.'- Since subsidies have
been limited to the poorest-and consequently in the urban areas
largely to blacks--extensive social class concentrations and ultistantive amendments to the United States Housing Act of 1937 contained in the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. II,
§ 201(a), 88 Stat. 654 (1974).
'3 Great reliance has beeen placed in British housing policy on the
direct provision of housing by public authorities-in the main, the local
housing authorities, but also New Town Development Corporations and
the Scottish Special Housing Association. At the end of 1970 some 5.7
million dwellings in Britain were publicly owned: forming 28 per cent
of the total in England and Wales ....

In 1971, new building was

divided roughly 45 per cent public and 55 per cent private....
With this high rate of public authority building, the proportion
which it constitutes of the total stock is steadily increasing: in England
and Wales, from 12 per cent in 1947 to 25 per cent in 1961 and 28 per
cent in 1970.
2 J. CULLINGWORTH, PROBLEMS OF AN URBAN SociETY 43-44 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as CULLINGWORTH].
According to Mandelker: "Two-thirds of all rental housing in England is
publicly owned." MANDELKER, supra note 11, at 7. The American public housing
effort hardly bears comparison. "Nationally, only about three or four percent of
all rental housing is publicly owned .

. . ."

Id. at 6.

Indeed, "the public housing

program was never very large; since 1937, when it began, only about one million
units have been built, The vast majority of poor people did not (and do not now)
receive housing aid, other than through welfare ....... Gans, A Poor Man's
Home Is His Poorhouse, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 20.
14 "American public housing serves a narrowly defined income group, and
is limited to the lowest income groups in the population." MANDELKER, supra note
11, at 8. See note 13 supra.
15 The abandonment, and in some cases, the demolition of public housing
projects is a national scandal. The paradigm is St. Louis' Pruitt-Igoe housing
project, once 43 brick buildings, each 11 stories tall, built in 1954 on a 57-acre site
at a cost of 36 million dollars. At its peak occupancy, the project housed some
12,000 people, but by March of 1972, only 600 of the 2,800 units were occupied,
more than a third of the buildings were empty. Smashed windows and interiors
ravaged by vandalism, neglect, fires, and weather pervaded the complex. As part
of a rehabilitation plan exceeding by more than 3' million dollars the original construction cost, HUD undertook controlled explosions to destroy parts of the project,
ignoring local pleas to raze the entire project and replace it with more liveable units geared to the needs of the tenants. N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1972, § 1,
at 32, col. 3. For a pre-demolition assessment of Pruitt-Igoe, refer to Cooper,
St. Louis Housing Disaster: Lessons for All Big Cities, L.A. Times, Aug. 30,

1971, pt. I, at 1, col. 1.
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mately apartheid has resulted.' 6 This conflict between public
housing policy and larger social objectives has led to plans -to disperse public housing and to increase the socio-economic diversity
of the tenants. These initiatives are designed to ultimately mirror
the British situation where public housing tenancy is not so sharply
skewed in terms of class or race.
On the other hand, Mandelker suggests that British efforts
,to narrow, the range of housing subsidies to eliminate help to those
who require less of it may have 'the effect of concentrating subsidies at the very lowest income levels.' 7 The observations he
makes are interesting, but the differences between ,the two systems are so striking that it is fair to say that the British are in
little danger of repeating the American public housing disaster.
In the first place, public housing is so pervasive in England that
its very extent should serve as a check to socio-economic homogeneity. Secondly, England simply does not have the intense racial problem that has disfigured American public housing and national life, nor is it likely to have such a problem, since a series
of governmental measures has effectively shut off the flow of nonwhites to England.'
Because of the limitations imposed by a comparative study,
which demands a substantial amount of exposition of the foreign
system and correspondingly restricts the amount (and subtlety) of
attention to native problems, Mandelker's work often only traces
the contours of the housing problems in the countries under consideration. He is unable -to discuss in sufficient degree the fundamental differences between the structure of government and policy formulation in the two nations and the impact that these differences have on housing-related issues.
Nonetheless, the book has a variety of uses, not the least of
which is to expose through a comparison of the two systems some
16 The use of the South African phrase is inescapable.

See A.

SACHS,

JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 11 (1973). The segregation in American public housing projects is extreme, virtually total, in the large urban areas. See Gau-

treaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 910 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
17
18

supra note 11, at 8.
[The British race relations situation] is, at this stage, fundamentally
MANDELKER,

different from that of the United States. The size of the non-white population is much smaller in over-all and relative terms; . . . the economically active immigrants have a high level of employment, do not mainly
live in ghetto areas, nor do their children go to de facto segregated
schools.

Abbott, The Situation in the United Kingdom, in
CRIMINATION IN BRITAIN 13 (S. Abbott ed. 1971).

THE PREVENTION OF RACIAL

DIs-

The effort at curbing the flow of non-Europeans into Great Britain and its
impact on race relations is traced in Hepple, The Street Report on Anti-Discrimination Legislation and Report of the Committee on Immigration Appeals, 31
MODERN L. REv. 310 (1968), and in Evans, Immigration Act 1971, 35 MODERN
L. REv. 508, 509 (1972).
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of the issues that were important in the struggle between, the
Nixon Administration and Congress which culminated in the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974's signed during the pre-pardon "honeymoon" of President Ford. Specifically,
the book provides a helpful gloss on the problems of providing
an adequate supply of housing and ensuring racial and economic
integration within that housing, problems which the new legislation attempts to solve.
II.

SCARCITY, INTEGRATION AND THE HOUSING AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1974

Prior to the passage of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, the Nixon Administration sent several farreaching proposals to Congress which would have sharply and
"radically" transformed traditional strategies for governmental intervention in the housing market.20 The Administration, for ex19 Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 et seq. (1974). The legislation is an
eight-title omnibus bill of nearly 110 pages, encompassing subjects
ranging from a comprehensive community development program and
major reforms in federally-assisted housing and comprehensive planning,
to new standards for mobile home construction and new flexibility in
housing credit. The dollar figure for new authorizations under the act
totals 11.9 billion dollars.
* . . [The legislation] was . . . a substantial victory for national interest groups who pressed for a final bill that set national objectives for
the use of community development funds, for extension and reforms of
existing housing assistance programs, and for a federal involvement in
the ultimate fate and success of the program efforts.
Nenno, The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974: An Interpretation; Its History, 8 J. HOUSING 344, 345 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Nenno].
The Nixon Administration had hoped to greatly reduce the federal government's
active role in the provision of housing for the poor. The Administration's bill
would have terminated all new traditional public housing activity after December
31, 1975. S. 2507, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 301, at 86 (1973); H.R. 10688, 93d
Cong., Ist Sess. § 301, at 85 (1973). See note 20 infra. Asan interim measure,
the Administration sought to tailor the existing "leased housing" subsidy program
to fit their philosophy of reduced governmental involvement in housing. Refer
to notes 27-34 & accompanying text infra.
[The decision to attempt to halt the construction of public housing] was
based on two premises fundamental to the housing philosophy of the
Nixon Administration: The big city-owned public housing projects of
the past were failures that should not be repeated; and what poor people
need is not housing built for them but money that will enable them to
shop for housing in the private market.
L.A. Times, June 27, 1974, pt. I, at 1, col. 4. The compromise legislation signed
by President Ford perpetuates the public construction of housing for the low-income and among other reforms, eliminates the requirement for a 20 percent gap
between admission limits in public housing and the income required for access to
private apartments. Actually, the 1974 Act completely rewrites the Housing Act
of 1937 and hence, the public housing program. Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. II, 88
Stat. 653 (1974).
20 Though widely regarded as a conservative, President Richard Nixon did
advance new ideas, some arguably "radical." One comment on the draft of the
speech in which a guaranteed-income proposal was advanced as part of the Family Assistance Plan explained: "'You miss Richard Nixon's main point, which is
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ample, unsuccessfully proposed the abolition of the National Hous-

ing Act's Section 235 and Section 236 programs. 2

Section 235

is designed to encourage individual home purchases by subsidizing
the cost of interest to as low as one percent, thereby making housing available to lower/middle and lower-income Americans. 22
Section 236 permits similar subsidies for private non-profit,
limited dividend, or cooperative sponsors of low and moderate in-

come rental housing projects.23 Neither program has been with-

Comment of William Safire,
to make a radical proposal seem conservative.'"
quoted in D. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME 218 (1973).
In the case of the Family Assistance Plan and its guaranteed-income section, Richard Nixon can be thought of as having supported both ideas that were novel as
well as ones traditionally associated with the political left. In housing programs,
however, his proposals, except for the housing allowance scheme, a distant relation
of the guaranteed-income, were radical only in the sense that they broke with
the tradition of "subsidizing the cost of new construction." A. SOLOMON, HousING THE URBAN POOR 35 (1974) (recent work which is skeptical about the efficacy of traditional strategies).
21 The Administration's proposed housing legislation, entitled the Housing
Act of 1973, was prefaced with severe criticism of existing subsidy programs. S.
2507, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(a) (1973); H.R. 10688, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 102(a) (1973). The Administration proposed a revised National Housing Act
which did not provide for the continuance of the Section 235 or 236 programs.
Id. at tit. II. However,
[t]he original Senate-passed 1974 bill . . . contained a complete rewriting
of the National Housing Act and of the United States Housing Act of
1937, incorporating completely reformed versions of the Federal Housing
Administration's Section 235 home-ownership and Section 236 multifamily rental housing programs. . . . What survived in the new 1974
act is a complete rewriting of the 1937 act-and, hence, of the public
housing program. The Senate's proposed consolidation and simplification of the National Housing Act was not achieved but a number of the
Senate's major individual reforms of the Section 235 and 236 programs
are a part of the new legislation.
Nenno, supra note 19, at 355. See Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. II, §§ 210, 211, 88 Stat. 671-74 (1974), amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715Z, 1715Z-1 (1970) (commonly referred to as Sections 235
and 236 of the National Housing Act).
22 Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383,
tit. II, § 210, 88 Stat. 671-72 (1974), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1715Z (1970). Section 235 is designed to stimulate the flow of private funds into the production of
housing while making it possible for people in the $3,000 to $8,000 income
bracket to own homes. The program operates by enabling prospective home purchasers to obtain loans at the current FHA rate with a minimum downpayment
of 3 percent of acquisition cost. The government pays the mortgagee a mortgage
assistance payment which reduces the amount paid by the homeowner on account
of interest to a figure potentially as low as 1 percent.
The low monthly interest as well as the low principal payments and modest
down payment induced many low-income families to purchase homes. Moving
more families into the private home market was also a boon to the construction
industry, which is now in a record slump partly because of a lack of funds for
housing.
A description of the mechanics of Section 235 is contained in Shafer & Field,
Section 235 of the National Housing Act: Homeownership for Low-Income Families, 46 J.URBAN LAW 684 (1969); and H. MCGEE & D. WHITMAN, LOW-INCOME
HOUSING 1 (1971).
23 Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383,
tit. II, § 211, 88 Stat. 672-74 (1974), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1715Z-1 (1970). It
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out its problems, but both strategies constitute a positive step towards ameliorating the severe housing shortage which affects all
America.2 4 In addition, 'the Nixon Administration announced in
June of 1974 'that it had decided to stop construction of public
housing. 25 As a constructive alternative to the largely negative
policy of halting the construction of new units, the Administration

lobbied for its new housing allowance program, an 'advocacy that
finds expression in the new housing legislation. 6
As an interim program, ,the Nixon Administration revised and
expanded the Section 23 "leased housing" program of the 1965
Housing and Urban Development Act.27
But changes propounded in 1974 by Regulations of the Department of Housing and

Urban Development (HUD) ran the risk of reshaping the program so substantially as to undermine its objectives of increasing
reduces the effective interest rate on a privately-financed mortgage to as little as
1 percent. For citations of recent literature on Section 236, refer to Note,
ProceduralDue Process in Government-SubsidizedHousing, 86 HARV. L. REv. 880,
882-87 nn.13-15, 17, 19-26 (1973).
24 A response to the argument that the programs should be abandoned

because of abuses is contained in

SUBCOMM.

ON PRIORITIES AND ECONOMY IN

GOV'T OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 93D CONG., lST SESS., REPORT ON HousING SUBSIDIES AND HOUSING POLICY (Joint Comm. Print 1973).
Until all Federal Housing programs were halted by the Nixon Administration in January, 1973, 235 and 236 were on the way to providing almost half as many dwelling units in four years as public housing had
provided in 35 years, although most of them went to families well above
the poverty line; the median income of their occupants was about $5,500.
Gans, A Poor Man's Home Is His Poorhouse, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1974, § 6
(Magazine), at 20.
25 See Lippman, U.S. to Quit Constructing Public Housing Will Pay Rent
for Poor, L.A. Times, June 27, 1974, pt. I, at 1, col. 4.
"6 Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. VIII, § 804, 88 Stat. 725, 726 (1974), amending
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-609, tit. V, § 504,
84 Stat. 1786 (1970). The legislation authorizes expansion of the housing allowance program on an experimental basis to demonstrate the feasibility of providing
direct cash payments to families to meet "rental or homeownership expenses." A
housing allowance has been defined as
[a] series of regular periodic payments made to an individual or family
currently unable to afford decent housing in a suitable living environment. Family need in relation to the cost of standard units in moderate
housing cost neighborhoods determines the amount of the allowance.
The individual or family involved must use the allowance to make rental
or home ownership payments.
Jackson, The Case for Housing Allowances, EBONY, Jan. 1974, at 23-24. Cf. Beckham, The Experimental Housing Allowance Program, 30 J. HOUSING 12 (1973);
Jacobs, The Housing Allowance Program in Kansas City Turns Into a Notable
Failure, PLANNING, Oct. 1973, at 10.
27 Section 23, as it existed before the 1974 Act is to be found at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1421b (1970) (originally enacted as Housing and Urban Development Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-117, tit. I, § 103(a), 79 Stat. 455 which added a new section
23 to the Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888). Section 23 has been absorbed into the new Act's revision of the 1937 Act. For a discussion of Section
23 refer to Friedman & Krier, A New Lease on Life: Section 23 Housing and
the Poor, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 611 (1968).
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the supply of rental housing available to low-income people and
spreading the units throughout the entire housing stock.
Under the basic plan for Section 23, local housing authorities
(LHA's) were instructed to "conduct a continuing survey and listing of the available dwelling units within the community" and
were also authorized to invite owners of suitable dwelling units
to enter into contracts with them.2 s Under normal circumstances,
the LHA would lease the unit directly from the owner, pay the
owner his monthly rent, and collect a portion of the rent from the
tenants. For the owner, this was a strong incentive to enter into
a lease with the LHA. The scheme protected landlords from absconding tenants and economic losses from long-term vacancies.
Thus, the LHA was able to attract owners to the program and bargain for reductions in rents.29 In Los Angeles, for instance, the
LHA was able to attract owners by offering for a certain consideration to contribute to maintenance, to perform -all management
functions including the selection of tenants, and to keep all accounts and records for inspection by the owner. 30
But as revised by the HUD Regulations, Section 23 tenants
were given the responsibility for locating suitable dwellings even
though they generally lack the ability and expertise necessary to
find housing in what is in reality a "seller's market."'" This modification seriously undermined the all-important dispersal objective
of Section 23, designed to integrate low-income tenants into more
affluent neighborhoods. Without guidance from the LHA, tenants are surely more likely to look in their "own" neighborhoods
rather than wander adventurously into areas from which they have
been effectually excluded.
Hunting for an apartment was not the sole duty imposed upon
tenants by the HUD Regulations. The LHA was also prohibited
28

42 U.S.C. § 1421b(d)

(1970), as amended, Housing and Community

Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. II, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 65367 (1974)

(absorbing all of Section 23 into a revised Housing Act of 1937).

The

language of the statute also allowed a direct lease between the assisted tenant and
the owner, with payment of the subsidized portion of the rent arranged through
a collateral agreement between the LHA and the owner.

utilized by LHA's.

This option was seldom

Interview by Mitch Lane, third year member, UCLA Law

Review, with an executive of the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles,

in Los Angeles, Cal., May 16, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Interview].
29

For example, in the Los Angeles area, prior to the ceiling proposed by the

HUD Regulations of May 13, 1974, (refer to notes 31-37 infra) a one-bedroom
apartment with a monthly private-market rent of $160 could have been leased
by the LHA for $135; a two-bedroom with a monthly listing of $185 could have
been secured for $155, and a three-bedroom apartment with a monthly rental of
$210 for an unsubsidized tenant would have been leased to the LHA for $185.
Interview, supra note 28.

Id.
31 HUD Reg. § 1274.103(a), 39 Fed. Reg. 17188 (1974).

30
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from contracting a lease with owners. 2 Rather, the tenant signed
the lease and both the tenant and the LHA paid their respective
shares of the rent to the owner. The LHA was also prohibited
from providing any management or maintenance functions, 33 or
from paying any subsidy to the owner when the unit was vacant
except when tenants vacated in violation of the lease and the
owner had taken all feasible actions to fill the units. 4 These
changes effectively eliminated both the inducement for owners to
accept Section 23 tenants and any bargaining power the wouldbe tenants and the LHA might have.
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 absorbs Section 23 into what is now Section 8 of the United States
Housing Act of 1937. This program, acronymed "HAP," reflects the compromise that pervades most of the new housing legislation and until new regulations are written and implemented,
no definitive comparative analysis of Section 23 and "HAP" is possible. 35 But the central idea of dispersed, rather than concentrated,
publicly supported housing is a central feature of the legislation.
Moreover, the range of the subsidy is broadened in both the
"leased housing" as well as in the traditional public housing program which remains in force over Administration protest.3 6 On
the other hand, whether the program will be implemented so as
to encourage participation by the private sector remains to be seen
may break through
since the spirit of the Section 23 regulations
37
,the ambiguities of the new legislation.
32

Id. at § 1274.103(g), 39 Fed. Reg. 17189.

33

Id.

Under the HUD Regulations to Section 23, where the LHA continues to
pay rent for a vacant apartment (i.e., the tenant left in violation of the lease, and
the owner has made unsuccessful, diligent efforts to fill the vacancy), the amount
paid by the LHA is only the amount of the subsidy payment, which varies with
the income of the tenant. It may be as low as a few dollars per month.
35 Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. II, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 662 (1974).
Previous
Section 23 programs are unaffected by Section 8 (see, id. at § 208, 88 Stat. 669)
and are presumably still controlled by the HUD Regulations. Note that regulations have been proposed by HUD that will control the new "HAP" program.
See HUD Proposed Regs., 39 Fed. Reg. 40668-99 (1974); id. at 41062-92 (1974).
36 Refer to note 19 supra.
37 Viz., Section 8(e)(2) of the amended United States Housing Act of
1937 (Pub. L. No. 83-383, tit. II, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 665 (1974)), which might
be consistent with the HUD Regulations' "finders-keepers" policy (HUD Reg.
§ 1274.103(a), 39 Fed. Reg. 17188 (1974)) which throws the entire responsibility
of locating suitable space on the tenants. Ostensibly this strategy maximizes dispersal, but as already noted, it may in practice lead tenants to look only in familiar neighborhoods. Whether HUD tailors the new legislation to fit the pattern
of the pre-legislation realities depends on, at least in part, to what extent "the
national nightmare" (to use President Ford's phrase, L.A. Times, Aug. 10, 1974,
pt. I, at 1, col. 5) is in fact over. As one commentator asked, "Will the Ford
Administration interpret the new act in the spirit of compromise in which it was
enacted . . . or as a mandate to fulfill the objectives of the former Nixon Administration?" Nenno, supra note 19, at 346.
34
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Since the future of "HAP" and dispersed public housing is
still undetermined, Mandelker's book, which ends with a suggestion resembling more the original Section 23 than the revision
worked by the recent HUD Regulations, may be influential in the
debates on policy sure to mark HUD's implementation of ,the new
Section 8 of ,the amended United States Housing Act of 1937:
The leased public housing program has many advantages.
Controls over rents are provided by the requirement that the
lease between the owner of the unit and the public housing
agency be negotiated by and acceptable to the public housing
agency before the housing unit is taken into the program.
The guarantee afforded the private landlord by the long-term
lease and the public housing agency's guarantee of payment
should also encourage the landlord both to make necessary
repairs and improvements, and to take a lower rent than he
would have demanded from an unsubsidized lower income
tenant who cannot give him the same financial assurances.
Since leases for these units can be negotiated for housing located anywhere in the housing market, -the dispersal objective
is also easier to achieve under this program. Subsidy costs
are lower whenever existing units are utilized, although the
program has also been used for units that are newly constructed and that are then taken into the public housing program.3a
Mandelker's observations with respect to the functioning of
the Section 23 program did of course precede the struggle over
the various bills which eventually led to the 1974 Act. This struggle between divergent philosophies on government involvement
in housing also shaped the fate of other subsidy programs, which
were either abolished or continued in the various bills proposed by the sides in the battle. The 357-page Senate bill, which
passed by a 76 to 11 margin, 9 (a substantial part of which was
enacted into the 1974 Act) built incrementally upon traditional
subsidy strategies, but reflected a consensus shared by virtually
all students of subsidy programs that racial and economic homogeneity is the curse of public housing programs. In order to avoid
the concentration of very low-income projects by themselves, the
Senate bill and the 1974 Act itself introduced the concept of a
cross-section of eligible income groups in both public and FHA
assisted housing.4" To prevent excessive increases in rent, the
note 11, at 221.
39 S. 3066, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) passed the Senate on March 11,
1974. 120 CONG. REC. S 3379 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1974).
40 With respect to public housing, the new Act contains at least two separate
provisions that will effect the "economic mix" of the tenants. See Pub. L. No.
93-383, tit. II, §§ 201(a)(3)(1) (requiring 20 percent of units be occupied by very
low-income families), 201(a)(6)(c)(4)(A) (requiring that housing authorities
comply with Secretary's tenant selection criteria which assure families with a broad
income range) (1974). In regard to the Section 236 program, an economic mix
of occupants has been promoted by the deletion of the statutory requirement of
38 MANDELKER, supra
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Senate bill and the Act also contained provisions for allocating
federal operating assistance to Section 236 programs in the event
of increases in operating costs. 4 '
The principal House bill also built on past programs4 2 and
contained basically the same reforms of existing programs as the
Senate version, but terminated all new public housing activity
in favor of a housing block-grant approach designed to distribute
significant sums to local governments to meet their housing needs
according to their own realities, and it must be said, prejudices.4 "
Reformed Sections 235 and 236 were to continue as a supplement
to locally orchestrated housing programs funded by block grants.4 4
In short, the Administration rejected the past, the Senate affirmed it, and the House legislation poured old wine from the
bottle of "New Federalism." The legislation ultimately signed by
President Ford was the product of major compromises and concessions between the Administration and Congress as well as national
interest groups concerned with housing and community development. The legislation sets a "middle course between the program
directions of the past, including a strong federal role, 'and a new
tack-the Nixon 'New Federalism'-based on an unqualified shift
to local responsibility."4 5 What emphasis HUD will give the new
legislation is yet unclear, but certainly national housing policy will
be profoundly affected by local level response fueled by block
grant "automatic entitlement" to federal assistance funds based on
local need.4 6
III.

CONCLUSION

Mandelker's book conveys neither the drama nor the urgency
of British or American housing problems. Though the deficiency
preference to the lowest income groups. In addition, the Secretary has been given
flexibility in establishing an income ceiling, Id. at § 212(5). See also, id. at
§ 212(2)(2)(B).
41 Id. at § 212(3).
42 H.R. 10036, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
(the proposed Housing and
Community Development Act of 1973).
43

Id.

44 Id.
45 Nenno, supra note 19, at 345.

46 While a local community can reject the offer of federal assistance by
failing to file an application to claim its entitlement, such action must
come through a deliberate decision to ignore its local housing and community development needs, even with federal money already assured.
The indication is that about 1100 local political jurisdictions are eligible
for grant entitlements for community development funds. . ..

Similarly, the HUD Secretary may allocate housing assistance funds

on the basis of "need criteria" to states and HUD area offices across
the nation, providing a first opportunity for all localities to apply for assistance, before the distribution of funds on the basis of "demand" represented in actual applications.

id. at 347. See Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. I, §§ 105, 106, 88 Stat. 641-47 (1974).
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is a problem of style, it is also a question of emphasis: The book
confines itself to the history, organization and allocation of public
housing in the United States and England, and primarily to the
mechanics of ,the most direct American ,and British subsidy-the
public construction and management of housing. Other subsidy
schemes receive consideration, most notably the English rent rebate system,4 7 and to a lesser extent, the American housing allowance program.4 8 But such important subsidies as the Section 235
and Section 236 programs as well as the FHA conventional mortgage programs receive scant attention. Finally, the most serious
omission is the lack of attention to the greatest subsidy of allgives middle and upper-inthe tax relief which the government
49
come Americans who own homes.

Perhaps the suggestion that the book is not broad enough in
scope is but a quibble-or a question of properly titling a significant discussion of public housing. For if the book is understood
to be primarily about public housing, then it does serve as an excellent point of departure for consideration of subsidy policy. The
clarity of presentation and discussion has the virtue of defusing
what has become, to say the least, inflamed public discourse. But
while reading Mandelker's book, those of us who have seen
American and British housing problems "close up" may occasionally complain that the blandness of style obscures the depth and
urgency of housing needs in the 1970's.
For the informed student of public housing, Mandelker's
study will be useful for his essays entitled "Perspectives on Housing Subsidy Problems," 50 and "Policy Problems in Housing Subsidy
Programs."'" Those new to the study of housing problems will
find his excellent and unpadded bibliography a guide to the rele47 MANDELKER, supra note 11, at 173-206.

The rent rebate system is a

process in which an unrebated rent is first set for the housing under a so-called
fair rent standard, and a portion of the rent is then rebated by the local authority
to tenants unable to pay the fair rent. In turn, the local authority may receive
a national subsidy to cover part of the rebate cost.
48 Id. at 213-18. Refer to note 26 supra, for a discussion of the housing
allowance program under the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-609, tit. V, § 504, 84 Stat. 1786.
49 The murky provisions of the Internal Revenue Code contain the most
important housing programs currently administered by the federal gov-

ernment. One "program" costs the Treasury at least $7 billion per year.
It subsidizes nearly every homeowner in the United States.
H. AARON, SHELTER AND SUBsIDIEs 53 (1972).

Home ownership is spurred by tax "breaks" in England also.
Tax reliefs on mortgage interest payments may or may not be considered as 'subsidy'; this is entirely a matter of definition. Nevertheless,
they definitely reduce the cost of buying a house (and, for those who
can afford it-the cost of buying a second house).
CULLINGWORTH, supra note 13, at 58.
50 MANDELKER, supra note 11, at 1.
51 Id. at 25.
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vant literature in the field.
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More importantly, his comparison of

two different housing systems underscores ,the value of, and need
for, comprehensive and intensive research into ways of meeting
,the worldwide need for decent shelter. 2

HENRY W. MCGEE, JR.*
52 Though the Mandelker book compares two Western democracies, there
is evidence the problem has resisted solution by Eastern European planners. A
Conservative British news magazine has observed:
The Communist part of Europe suffers from an acute shortage of housing. It is partly because there is not enough labour and building materials, but is also the result of too rigid a planning system. Just how big
the problem is for Poland was revealed by Mr. Edward Gierek, the Polish party leader, at the end of last year. He estimated that to put every
Polish family in its own home would require a staggering 7.3 million
dwellings by 1990-or two and a half times the construction rate of the
past 20 years.
You Can't Keep a Good Home Down, Th'E ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 1973, at 41.
* In 1973 the author was a Visiting Fellow at Wolfson College, Oxford.
With the cooperation of the Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies and the University of London (Bedford College), he undertook a study of British housing
problems on grants from the UCLA Center for Afro-American Studies and
UCLA Committee on International and Comparative Studies. He now teaches
Urban Housing and Redevelopment at UCLA School of Law.

